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In March 1989, the Exxon Valdez ran aground and spilled
millions of gallons of oil into Prince William Sound. The trial
court phase of the private civil suit concerning that accident cul-
minated in 1996 in a $5.057 billion judgment against Exxon.' Al-
most the entire judgment was based on a jury's award of $5 bil-
lion in punitive damages 2-- the largest monetary penalty ever im-
posed in an American court.
If Exxon had been convicted of a crime, a judge would have
determined its sentence.3 If Exxon had been found liable for a
civil penalty under the Clean Water Act, a judge would have set
the amount of its penalty.4 Punitive damages "share key charac-
teristics of criminal sanctions"5 and are also similar to civil statu-
tory penalties.6 But because Exxon's penalty was in the form of
t Partner, Williams & Connolly, Washington, D.C.
In re Exxon Valdez, No A-89-0095-CV (D Alaska, Sept 24, 1996), appeal pending.
2 In re Exxon Valdez, No A-89-0095-CV, 1995 US Dist LEXIS 12952, *12 (D Alaska).
In criminal cases (other than capital cases) sentences are determined by judges in
both federal court and the courts of all but eight states. By statute, defendants in six
states have a right, in cases triable to a jury, to have a jury fix their punishment, within
the limits established by statute. Ark Code Ann § 5-4-103 (Michie 1993); Ky Rev Stat Ann
§ 532.055(2) (Baldwin 1990 & Supp 1997); Miss Code §§ 97-3-67, 97-3-71 (1994) (granting
this right only for crimes of rape and statutory rape); 57 Okla Stat Ann § 353 (West 1991);
Tex Crim Proc Code Ann Art 37.07 § 2(bX2) (Vernon 1981 & Supp 1997) (giving defendant
right to choose judge or jury); Va Code § 19.2-295 (1995 & Supp 1997). In Tennessee, de-
fendants have such a right in misdemeanor cases. Ten Code Ann § 40-20-104 (Michie
1990). In Missouri, a trial judge can impose a sentence less than or equal to the sentence
chosen by the jury. Mo Ann Stat § 557.036(3) (Vernon 1979 & Supp 1997).
Pursuant to a court-approved settlement with the state and federal governments,
Exxon had pled guilty in 1991 to four misdemeanors, paid a $25 minion fine (remitted
from $150 million because Exxon had spent $2.5 billion in cleanup costs), and agreed to
pay $900 million in additional cleanup costs. Judge Endorses $1 Billion Exxon Valdez
Settlement, Wash Post A4 (Oct 9, 1991); Tom Kenworthy and Hal Bernton, $1 Billion-Plus
Accord Reached in Exxon Spill, Wash Post A6 (Oct 1, 1991).
See 33 USC § 1319(d) (1994); Tull v United States, 481 US 412, 426-27 (1987).
Landgraf v USI Film Products, 511 US 244, 281 (1994) (holding that the punitive
damages provision of Section 102(bXl) of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 cannot be applied to
conduct that occurred before the law was enacted).
' Tull, 481 US at 422 n 7.
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punitive damages, a jury determined how much Exxon should
pay.
The Exxon Valdez litigation epitomizes a disparity in the al-
location of penalty-setting power that exists both in federal court
and in nearly all state courts. Noting this disparity, the Fourth
Circuit recently adopted a new and more stringent standard for
post-trial review of jury awards of punitive damages.' It con-
cluded that, to the extent that a punitive damages award rests on
a policy judgment (as opposed to a determination of the facts), a
trial judge deciding a motion for remittitur may independently
assess how much the defendant should be punished.'
Similarly, bills concerning product liability cases introduced
in Congress in recent years would have given both federal and
state trial judges a greater role in awarding punitive damages. In
general, the bills would cap punitive damages at the greater of
$250,000 or two times compensatory damages, and a jury's award
exceeding the cap could stand only if the trial judge determined
in a separate proceeding that the jury's award was warranted."
This Article considers whether, as to cases brought in federal
court, the courts can and should go further than either the
Fourth Circuit or the recent bills, and squarely place all of the
Juries set punitive damages in the first instance in federal court and in the courts of
nearly every state that permits the recovery of such damages. The exceptions are the Kan-
sas courts and, in certain actions, the Connecticut courts. Kan Stat Ann § 60-37 01(a)
(Supp 1992); Gen Stat Conn §§ 31-290a(b), 35-53(b), 36a-618, 42-110g(a), 46a-98(d), 52-
240b (1997).
' Atlas Food Systems & Services v Crane National Vendors, 99 F3d 587, 594-95 (4th
Cir 1996).
The Fourth Circuit acknowledged that juries are well suited to determine facts rele-
vant to the amount of punitive damages, but stressed that "other policy-related ele-
ments-e.g., the likelihood that an award will deter the defendant or others from engaging
in similar conduct-are not factual questions and, therefore, are more appropriately de-
cided by the trial judge." Id at 594. The Fourth Circuit concluded that "when reviewing the
amount of a jury's punitive award under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59, the district
court has a participatory decisionmaking role that it does not have when reviewing a
jury's findings based solely on facts." Id. "While a district court must give due respect to a
jury's comparative advantages in initially deciding upon the amount of punitive damages
to award, the court may depart from that award to the extent that it concludes that its
own comparative advantages warrant such a departure.... The coures review of the
amount of a punitive damage award should involve comparison of the coures independent
judgment on the appropriate amount with the jury's award to determine whether the
jury's award is so excessive as to work an injustice." Id at 595.
10 See S 5, 105th Cong, 1st Sess § 108 (Jan 21, 1997); S 648, 105th Cong, 1st Sess § 108
(Jan 21, 1997). In March 1996, Congress passed a bill containing similar provisions, but
President Clinton vetoed it. Common Sense Product Liability Reform Act of 1996, intro-
duced as Common Sense Product Liability Reform Act of 1995, HR 956, 104th Cong, 2d
Sess (Feb 15, 1995), in 141 Cong Rec H 1849 (Feb 15 1995). On May 6, 1996, the House
failed to override the veto.
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power to decide the amount of punitive damages with trial
judges." The Supreme Court has never decided whether the Sev-
enth Amendment, which preserves the right to a jury trial in civil
cases brought in federal court, 2 confers a right to have punitive
damages set by a jury." Three Justices recently implied that the
Amendment confers no such right, observing, in Gasperini v Cen-
ter for Humanities, Inc," that "the level of punitive damages is
not really a Tact' 'tried' by the jury."
" In 1991, President Bush's Council on Competitiveness advocated shifting the power
to assess punitive damages from juries to judges. See A Report from the President's Coun-
cil on Competitiveness, Agenda for Civil Justice Reform in America 22 (1991). A Senate
committee has done likewise. See S 44, 98th Cong, 2d Sess § 12(c) (1984) (proposed law
providing for judicial assessment of punitive damages in product liability cases in federal
court), discussed in Product Liability Act, S Rep No 476, 98th Cong, 2d Sess 59 (1984)
(committee report accompanying S 44). See also S 100, 99th Cong, 1st Sess § 12(c) (1985)
(bill containing similar provision); HR 5214, 98th Cong, 2d Sess § 11(b), (c) (1984) (pro-
viding for judicial determination of both liability for, and amount of, punitive damages); S
2631, 97th Cong, 2d Sess §13(c) (1982) (same). Many commentators agree. See, for exam-
ple, Lisa VL Sharkey, Comment, Judge or Jury: Who Should Assess Punitive Damages?, 64
U Cin L Rev 1089, 1128-29 (1996); David G. Owen, Comment, Civil Punishment and the
Public Good, 56 S Cal L Rev 103, 120 (1992); Dorsey H. Ellis, Jr., Punitive Damages, Due
Process, and the Jury, 40 Ala L Rev 975, 1005-07 (1989); Richard C. Ausness, Retribution
and Deterrence: The Role of Punitive Damages in Products Liability Litigation, 74 Ky L J
1, 124 (1985); James B. Sales and Kenneth B. Cole, Jr., Punitive Damages: A Relic That
Has Outlived Its Origins, 37 Vand L Rev 1117, 1167-68 (1984); Jane Mallor and Barry
Roberts, Punitive Damages: Toward a Principled Approach, 31 Hastings L J 639, 664
(1980). Judge Kozinski also has questioned the assignment to juries of the power to set
punitive damages. See Alex Kozinski, The Case of Punitive Damages vs. Democracy, Ind
Law 12 (Oct 30-Nov 12, 1996).
""In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dol-
lars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be oth-
erwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the
common law." US Const, Amend VII.
"3 Unlike nearly all of the other protections of the Bill of Rights, the guarantees of the
Seventh Amendment have not been held to apply to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment. "The Seventh Amendment... governs proceedings in federal court, but not
in state court." Gasperini v Center for Humanities, Inc, 116 S Ct 2211, 2222 (1996) (foot-
note omitted). See Walker v Sauvinet, 92 US 90, 92 (1875) (Seventh Amendment is not a
"privilege or immunity... which the states are forbidden by the Fourteenth Amendment
to abridge."). The Seventh Amendment governs the right to jury trial in diversity as well
as federal question cases. Simler v Conner, 372 US 221, 222 (1963).
" 116 S Ct 2211, 2235 (1996) (Scalia, joined by Rehnquist and Thomas, dissenting).
Justice Scalia was quoting the Re-examination Clause of the Seventh Amendment, which
provides that "no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the
United States, than according to the rules of the common law." US Const, Amend VII. The
issue in Gasperini, which involved an award of compensatory damages, was whether the
Re-examination Clause precludes appellate review when a trial court denies a motion
seeking a new trial because the jury's verdict was excessive. The Court held that the Re-
examination Clause does not preclude such review. 116 S Ct at 2223-24. Justice Scalia,
joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas, would have held that the Re-
examination Clause prohibits appellate review of awards of compensatory damages, but
apparently would have reached a different conclusion as to punitive damages because the
182 The University of Chicago Law Review [65:179
The Supreme Court's 1987 decision in Tull v United States5
also indicates that the Seventh Amendment may not require jury
assessment of the amount of punitive damages. Tull held that a
citizen sued by the United States for a penalty under the Clean
Water Act had a right to have a jury determine his liability for a
penalty, but not its amount. The Court broadly stated that
"[n]othing in the Amendment's language suggests that the right
to a jury trial extends to the remedy phase of a civil trial,"" and
that it had seen "no evidence that the Framers meant to extend
the right to a jury to the remedy phase of a civil trial.""'
It is time to recognize that, at least in federal court, asking
juries to set punitive damages is neither constitutionally required
nor sound policy. The responsibility to decide the amount of puni-
tive damages, if the jury finds the defendant liable for such dam-
ages, should rest with the trial judge.
Part I of this Article discusses the origins of the Seventh
Amendment and the basic principles reflected in the Supreme
Court decisions interpreting it. Special attention is given to the
Supreme Court decisions establishing that the Seventh Amend-
amount of punitive damages is not a "fact" tried by ajury. Id at 2231-36.
Whether state jury-trial guarantees entitle a party to have a jury set punitive dam-
ages is similarly an open question in most states. Forty-seven state constitutions protect
the right to jury trial in civil cases in state court. See Ala Const, Art I, § 11; Alaska Const,
Art I, § 16; Ariz Coast, Art 11, § 23; Ark Const, Art II, § 7; Cal Const, Art I, § 16; Conn
Const, Art I, § 19; Del Const, Art 1, § 4; Fla Const, Art I, § 22; Ga Const, Art I, § 1, 91 11;
Hawaii Const, Art I, § 13; Idaho Const, Art I, § 7; Ill Const, Art I, § 13; Ind Const, Art I,
§ 20; Iowa Const, Art I, § 9; Kan Const, Bill of Rights § 5; Ky Const, Bill of Rights § 7; Me
Const, Art I, § 20; Md Const, Declaration of Rights, Art 23; Mass Const, pt I, Art 15; Mich
Const, Art I, § 14; Minn Const, Art I, § 4; Miss Const, Art III, § 31; Mo Const, Art 1,
§ 22(a); Mont Const, Art 11, § 26; Neb Const, Art I, § 6; Nev Const, Art I, § 3; NH Const, pt
I, Art 20; NJ Const, Art I, 1 9; NM Const, Art II, § 12; NY Coast, Art I, § 2; NC Const, Art
I, § 25 (limiting preservation of civil jury trial to "all controversies at law respecting prop-
erty"); ND Const, Art I, § 13; Ohio Const, Art I, § 5; Okla Const, Art II, § 19; Or Const, Art
VII, § 3; Pa Const, Art I, § 6; RI Const, Art I, § 15; SC Const, Art I, § 14; SD Const, Art VI,
§ 6; Tern Const, Art I, § 6; Tex Const, Art I, § 15; Utah Const, Art I, § 10 (held to protect
civil jury right in International Harvester Credit Corp v Pioneer Tractor and Implement,
Inc, 626 P2d 418, 421 (Utah 1981)); Vt Const, ch I, Art 12; Va Cost, Art I, § 11; Wash
Coast, Art I, § 21; W Va Const, Art I, § 13; Wis Const, Art I, § 5. Compare Smith v Prin-
tup, 254 Kan 315, 866 P2d 985, 994 (1993) (holding that there is no right to have a jury set
punitive damages), with Zoppo v Homestead Insurance Co, 71 Ohio St 3d'552, 644 NE2d
397, 401 (Ohio 1994), cert denied, 116 S Ct 56 (1995) (voiding statute that permitted court
to set punitive damages), and Henderson By Hartsfield v Alabama Power Co, 627 S2d 878,
885-86, 893-94 (Ala 1993) (striking down legislative cap on punitive damages as violating
the right to trial by jury).
481 US 412, 426-27 (1987).
16 Id at 426 n 9.
1 Id. The Fourth Circuit relied upon Tull in its recent decision endorsing more strin-
gent review ofjury awards of punitive damages. Atlas, 99 F3d at 595.
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ment preserves only the substance of the right of trial by jury
that was recognized by the English common law in the eighteenth
century.
Part H examines certain Supreme Court decisions that some
courts and commentators have read as establishing a Seventh
Amendment right to a jury determination of the amount of puni-
tive damages. This Part concludes that the decisions do not es-
tablish the existence of such a right.
Part III analyzes the Supreme Court's decision in Tull.
Part IV demonstrates that having juries fix punitive dam-
ages is not necessary to preserve the substance of the common-
law right to trial by jury. Under the English common law, there
was no right to a trial by jury on the issue of damages. In some
cases damages were determined in a trial by jury before a judge,
but often they were set by an inquest jury in a proceeding before
a sheriff pursuant to a writ of inquiry. Such an inquest was in-
tended to inform the conscience of the court, which could instead
assess damages itself. Moreover, the common law developed for
centuries before 1791, but punitive damages were not recognized
until 1763.18 In one of the early cases allowing damages in excess
of the plaintiff's injury, damages were decided by a jury pursuant
to a writ of inquiry. 9 Punitive damages today also differ signifi-
cantly from punitive damages in eighteenth century England.
Part V argues that, as a matter of policy, the power to set
punitive damages in federal court should rest with trial judges,
subject to appellate review, rather than with juries. Judges are
less susceptible to emotional factors, less likely to be unduly in-
fluenced by a defendant's wealth, more experienced in imposing
punishment, and more knowledgeable of the punishment imposed
in other cases.
Finally, Part VI shows that neither a new statute nor an
amendment to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is necessary
to permit federal trial judges to determine the amount of punitive
damages.
I. HISTORY OF THE SEVENTH AMENDMENT AND
ITS INTERPRETATION
The Constitution approved in September 1787 by the Consti-
tutional Convention in Philadelphia guaranteed the right to a
" See Wilkes v Wood, Lofft 1, 98 Eng Rep 489, 498-99 (CP 1763); Huckle v Money, 2
Wils KB 205, 95 Eng Rep 768, 769 (KB 1763).
19 See Benson v Frederick, 3 Burr 1845, 97 Eng Rep 1130, 1130 (KB 1766).
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jury trial in criminal cases,"0 but it said nothing of the right to a
jury trial in civil cases. It also lacked a bill of rights. The pro-
posed Constitution became the focus of a vigorous debate
throughout the country, with the Anti-Federalists vociferously
attacking it and the Federalists defending it. The Anti-
Federalists objected most strongly to the lack of a bill of rights,
the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction as to law and fact, and
the absence of a civil jury-trial guarantee.2
In several states, the Anti-Federalists succeeded in obtaining
support for proposed amendments protecting the right to jury
trial in civil cases. The Virginia Ratifying Convention urged the
adoption of an amendment providing that, "in controversies re-
specting property, and in suits between man and man, the an-
cient trial by jury is one of the greatest securities to the rights of
the people, and [is] to remain sacred and inviolable." New York's
convention proposed essentially the same amendment.' The
Massachusetts and New Hampshire conventions proposed an
amendment stating that "[i]n civil actions between Citizens of
different States every issue of fact arising in Actions at common
law shall be tried by a Jury, if the parties, or either of them, re-
quest it.'
In response, the Federalists denied that the Constitution was
intended to limit jury trials in civil cases,25 and they promised to
enact legislation to protect the right to a jury trial in such cases2
The Anti-Federalists insisted, however, on a constitutional guar-
antee. Their efforts led to the inclusion in the Bill of Rights of
what became the Seventh Amendment, guaranteeing a jury trial
in suits at common law and restricting re-examination of jury
verdicts:
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall
exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be pre-
US Const, Art IV, § 2, cl 3.
21 See Edith Guild Henderson, The Background of the Seventh Amendment, 80 Harv L
Rev 289, 295 (1966).
' Jonathan Elliot, 3 The Debates in the Several State Conventions, on the Adoption of
the Federal Constitution 658 (2d ed 1836) ("Elliot's Debates").
1 Elliot's Debates at 328-29.
Ralph Ketcham, ed, The Anti-Federalist Papers and the Constitutional Convention
Debates 219 (Mentor 1986); 1 Elliot's Debates at 326.
"See, for example, Federalist 83 (Hamilton), in Clinton Rossiter, ed, The Federalist
Papers 495, 498-99 (Mentor 1961).
"See Charles W. Wolfram, The Constitutional History of the Seventh Amendment, 57
Minn L Rev 639, 666 (1973).
See, for example, 3 Elliot's Debates at 579, 651-52.
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served, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-
examined in any Court of the United States, than according
to the rules of the common law."
The Bill of Rights was approved by Congress in September
1789,29 and obtained the required approval of three-fourths of the
states in late 1791.30
Although the general words of the Seventh Amendment were
sufficient to secure agreement in 1791, their meaning has been
sharply disputed many times in the two centuries since." The
Supreme Court has interpreted the Seventh Amendment in doz-
ens of decisions, not all of them consistent with each other. 2
Despite the controversy and uncertainty that have sur-
rounded the Seventh Amendment, several pertinent principles
concerning its scope are reasonably well established. The Su-
preme Court has held that the "common law" referred to in the
Seventh Amendment is the common law of England,' though not
all aspects of the English jury-trial system that existed in 1791
US Const, Amend VII.
1 Stat 98 (1789).
"See Wolfram, 57 Minn L Rev at 730 (cited in note 26) (reviewing the constitutional
history of the Seventh Amendment).
31 The Seventh Amendment has generated extensive scholarly commentary. Some of
the leading articles are Wolfram, 57 Minn L Rev 639 (cited in note 26); Martin H. Redish,
Seventh Amendment Right to Jury Trial: A Study in the Irrationality of Rational Decision
Making, 70 Nw U L Rev 486 (1975) (arguing that the Supreme Court should take account
of social conditions when interpreting the Seventh Amendment); Harold Chesnin and
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Chancery Procedure and the Seventh Amendment: Jury Trial of
Issues in Equity Cases Before 1791, 83 Yale L J 999 (1974) (showing that jury practice was
in transition in England during the 1790s, and suggesting that Seventh Amendment in-
terpretation is more complex than previously thought); Henderson, 80 Harv L Rev 289
(cited in note 21) (arguing that the Seventh Amendment was not intended to codify exist-
ing jury practice because there was no consistent practice in 1791); and Austin Wakeman
Scott, Trial by Jury and the Reform of Civil Procedure, 31 Harv L Rev 669 (1918) (dis-
cussing historical features of trial by jury and examining methods for controlling jury
power).
"Compare, for example, Dimick v Schiedt, 293 US 474, 487 (1935) ("[Here, we are
dealing with a constitutional provision which has in effect adopted the rules of the com-
mon law, in respect of trial by jury, as these rules existed in 1791."), with Gasperini v Cen-
ter for Humanities, Inc, 116 S Ct 2211, 2224 n 20 (1996) (noting that the meaning of the
Seventh Amendment was not fixed as of 1791). See also notes 60, 75-76, and accompany-
ing text.
"Markman v Westview Instruments, Inc, 116 S Ct 1384, 1389 (1996); Baltimore &
Carolina Line, Inc v Redman, 295 US 654, 657 (1935); Dimick, 293 US at 476-77; Thomp-
son v Utah, 170 US 343, 350 (1898), overruled on other grounds by Collins v Youngblood,
497 US 37 (1989). See United States v Wonson, 28 F Cases 745, 750 (Cir Ct D Mass 1812)
(opinion by Story). Compare Markman, 116 S Ct at 1389 n 3 ("Our formulations of the
historical test do not deal with the possibility of conflict between actual English common
law practice and American assumptions about what that practice was, or between English
and American practices at the relevant time.").
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are preserved against change.3 4 As a result, opinions interpreting
the Amendment have often included attempts to delve into the
law of eighteenth century England. 5 The Court has also held that
the Jury Trial Clause and the Re-examination Clause are inde-
pendent." Thus, even if a matter is not triable of right to a jury
under the Jury Trial Clause, if it is so tried the Re-examination
Clause limits post-trial and appellate review of the jury's verdict.
Although the Jury Trial Clause refers to "Suits at common
law," it has been interpreted to guarantee a jury trial not only on
causes of action that existed under the English common law, but
also on many causes of action not recognized until long after
1791. In several cases, the Supreme Court has applied a two-
pronged test in deciding whether a party is entitled to a jury trial
on a cause of action unknown to the English common law: the
first prong compares the new cause of action with actions brought
in eighteenth century England and asks whether similar causes
of action were tried to a jury; the second prong examines the na-
ture of the remedy sought."
It is well-settled that, even if a given cause of action triggers
a right to a jury trial, that right does not necessarily encompass
all issues relating to that cause of action.5 In its most recent dis-
cussion of this aspect of Seventh Amendment doctrine, the Su-
preme Court explained in Markman v Westview Instruments,
See notes 45-68, 76-77, and accompanying text.
See, for example, Markman, 116 S Ct at 1389-93.
Parsons v Bedford, 28 US (3 Pet) 433, 447 (1830).
See Wooddell v International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 502 US 93, 97-98
(1991); Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers Local 391 v Terry, 494 US 558, 565 (1990) (plu-
rality opinion); Granfinanciera, SA v Nordberg, 492 US 33, 42 (1989); Tull, 481 US at 417-
18. In its recent decision in Markman, where it was undisputed that the cause of action at
issue triggered a right to jury trial on some issues, the Court applied the first prong of this
test but not the second. 116 S Ct at 1389-92. Earlier cases had treated the second prong as
more important. See Terry, 494 US at 565 (plurality opinion); Granfinanciera, 492 US at
42; Tull, 481 US at 421. See also Curtis v Loether, 415 US 189, 194 (1974) (implying that
"the relief sought here" prong is "more importanV than analogous common law actions).
At least two cases applying the two-pronged test treated the presence of a claim for
money damages as.a factor strongly indicating that a particular cause of action triggered a
right to a jury trial. See Terry, 494 US at 570; Curtis, 415 US at 196-97.
In dicta in a 1970 decision, the Court identified a third factor bearing on whether an
issue is triable as of right to a jury: "the practical abilities and limitations of juries." Ross v
Bernhard, 396 US 531, 538 n 10 (1970). Most of the Coures Seventh Amendment decisions
since Ross have ignored this factor. See, for example, Terry, 494 US at 565 (using two-
prong test); Granfinanciera, 492 US at 42 (same). Part of the Markman opinion can be
read as reviving it as a significant consideration when history does not supply a clear an-
swer. 116 S Ct at 1395.
Markman, 116 S Ct at 1389-90; Tull, 481 US at 427.
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Inc39 that, "[i]f the action in question belongs in the law category,
we then ask whether the particular trial decision must fall to the
jury in order to preserve the substance of the common law right
as it existed in 1791.4o For example, even if a statutory cause of
action triggers the right to a jury trial under the Seventh
Amendment, a discretionary award of attorney's fees under the
statute may be determined by the trial court, not by a jury.41
The statement from Markman just quoted also embodies an-
other established-but far from precise-principle of Seventh
Amendment jurisprudence: the principle that the Amendment
preserves only "the substance of the common law right" of trial by
jury.4" The Supreme Court has declared that "the Amendment
was designed to preserve the basic institution of jury trial in only
its most fundamental elements," and that "[o]nly those incidents
which are regarded as fundamental, as inherent in and of the es-
sence of the system of trial by jury, are placed beyond the reach of
the legislature.""
A series of nineteenth century Supreme Court decisions ap-
plying this fundamental-elements principle approved the directed
verdict without pointing to any clear precedent for it in eight-
eenth century English law.45 Similarly, early in this century the
Court held that the Seventh Amendment does not prohibit sum-
mary judgment, a procedural device that was unknown in Eng-
land in 1791.4'
The fundamental-elements principle also was reflected in the
Court's 1897 decision in Walker v New Mexico & Pacific Railroad
Co,4" where a jury's answers to special interrogatories were incon-
sistent with its general verdict. The issue was whether the trial
court could enter judgment based on the answers to the special
116 S Ct 1384 (1996).
Id at 1389.
See, for example, Columbus Mills, Inc v Freeland, 918 F2d 1575, 1578 (11th Cir
1990); Pan Am World Airways, Inc v Ramos, 357 F2d 341, 342 (1st Cir 1966); Swofford v B
& W, Inc, 336 F2d 406, 413 (5th Cir 1964).
, Markman, 116 S Ct at 1389; Colgrove v Battin, 413 US 149, 156-57 (1973); Balti-
more & Carolina Line, Inc v Redman, 295 US 654, 657 (1935). See Capital Traction Co v
Hof, 174 US 1, 23 (1899) ("It is not 'trial by jury,' but 'the right of trial by jury,' which the
Amendment declares 'shall be preserved.').
Galloway v United States, 319 US 372, 392 (1943).
Tull, 481 US at 426, quoting Colgrove, 413 US at 156 n 11 (quoting Scott, 31 Harv L
Rev at 671 (cited in note 31)); Markman, 116 S Ct at 1389.
See Baylis v Travellers' Insurance Co, 113 US 316, 320-21 (1885); Oscanyan v Arms
Co, 103 US 261, 266-67 (1880); Pleasants v Fant, 89 US (22 Wall) 116, 120-21 (1874);
Parks v Ross, 52 US (11 How) 362, 372-73 (1850).
Fidelity & Deposit Co v United States, 187 US 315, 319-21 (1902).
4' 165 US 593, 594-95 (1897).
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interrogatories or could only grant a new trial. The Supreme
Court did not cite any precedent in the English common law for
entering a judgment contrary to the jury's general verdict.48 But it
held that the Seventh Amendment posed no obstacle to entry of
such a judgment, because the purpose of the Amendment "is not
to preserve mere matters of form and procedure but substance of
right."49
Numerous decisions in this century reflect the continuing
importance of the fundamental-elements principle. In 1920, the
Supreme Court held in Ex parte Peterson' that the Seventh
Amendment was not violated by the appointment of an auditor to
make a preliminary investigation, hear witnesses, examine fi-
nancial records, and prepare a report to be admitted at trial as
prima facie evidence. The Court acknowledged that "there did not
exist in England, or so far as appears in any of the colonies, any
officer, permanent or temporary, who, in connection with trials by
jury, exercised the powers of an auditor above described."5' The
Court nonetheless found no constitutional violation, because
"[n]ew devices may be used to adapt the ancient institution [of
jury trial] to present needs and to make of it an efficient instru-
ment in the administration of justice. 1 2
In 1931, the Court held in Gasoline Products Co v Champlin
Refining Co3 that when a new trial is granted because of an error
relating to one issue, the retrial may be limited to that issue, pro-
vided that "the issue to be retried is so distinct and separable
from the others that a trial of it alone may be had without injus-
tice." The Court so held despite the settled rule of the English
common law that a retrial had to be of the entire case.'In the 1943 case Galloway v United States,55 Justice Black,
joined in dissent by Justices Douglas and Murphy, attacked as
violative of the Seventh Amendment the expanded use of the di-
rected verdict that had been approved in a series of Supreme
Court decisions between 1871 and 1929. In response, a six-Justice
majority emphasized that the Constitution preserved only the
most fundamental elements of the English jury-trial system:
49 Id at 596-97.
4' Id at 596.
253 US 300, 310 (1920).
51 Id at 307-08.
Id at 309-10.
283 US 494, 500 (1931).
See id at 497.
319 US 372, 404-05 (1943).
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The Amendment did not bind the federal courts to the exact
procedural incidents or details of jury trial according to the
common law in 1791, any more than it tied them to the
common law system of pleading or the specific rules of evi-
dence then prevailing. Nor were "the rules of the common
law" then prevalent, including those relating to the proce-
dure by which the judge regulated the jury's role on ques-
tions of fact, crystallized in a fixed and immutable system.
On the contrary, they were constantly changing and devel-
oping during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centu-
ries. In 1791 this process already had resulted in widely di-
vergent common-law rules on procedural matters among the
states, and between them and England. And none of the con-
temporaneous rules regarding judicial control of the evidence
going to juries or its sufficiency to support a verdict had
reached any precise, much less final, form. In addition, the
passage of time has obscured much of the procedure which
then may have had more or less definite form, even for his-
torical purposes.
[Tlhe Amendment was designed to preserve the basic insti-
tution of jury trial in only its most fundamental elements,
not the great mass of procedural forms and details, varying
even then so widely among common-law jurisdictions.56
In its 1973 decision in Colgrove v Battin,7 a sharply divided
Court relied upon the fundamental-elements doctrine in holding
that the "jury trial," as guaranteed by the Seventh Amendment,
may be a trial before a jury of only six persons.58 The Court so
held despite the tradition of twelve-person juries dating back at
least to the fourteenth century,59 and despite the fact that many
of the Court's own decisions had assumed that the Seventh
Amendment requires a twelve-person jury."° In an opinion by
Id at 390-92 (footnotes omitted).
413 US 149, 157, 160 (1973).
Compare Richard Arnold, Trial by Jury: The Constitutional Right to a Jury of
Twelve in Civil Trials, 22 Hofstra L Rev 1 (1993) (criticizing Colgrove).
See Colgrove, 413 US at 176-77 (Marshall dissenting); Arnold, 22 Hofstra L Rev at
8.
" See Slocum v New York Life Insurance Co, 228 US 364, 397 (1913); Maxwell v Dow,
176 US 581, 586 (1900) (criminal case noting that Seventh Amendment right "implies that
there shall be an unanimous verdict of twelve jurors); Capital Traction Co, 174 US at 13.
Several other cases assume twelve-person juries, without discussing the Seventh Amend-
ment. See Crowell v Benson, 285 US 22, 61 (1932); Herron v Southern Pacific Co, 283 US
91, 95 (1931);Railroad Co v Stout, 84 US (17 Wall) 657, 664 (1873).
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Justice Brennan, the Court explained that the divergence of state
practices in 1791 had meant that the civil jury-trial provision of
the Bill of Rights "would necessarily have to be general," and that
in fact "the right was limited in general words to 'suits at com-
mon law."'' The Court could "only conclude.., that by referring
to the 'common law,' the Framers of the Seventh Amendment
were concerned with preserving the right of trial by jury in civil
cases where it existed at common law, rather than the various
incidents of trial by jury.""2 The Court framed the question as
"whether a jury of 12 is of the substance of the common-law right
of trial by jury,' 3 and concluded that it was not."
In its 1979 decision in Parklane Hosiery Co v Shore,65 the
Court again relied upon the fundamental-elements principle. The
Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") had brought an
equitable action in which it had secured a declaratory judgment
against a corporation for issuing a false and misleading proxy
statement." The Court held that the Seventh Amendment posed
no obstacle to applying the doctrine of collateral estoppel against
the corporation in a subsequent legal action by a class of stock-
holders, thus precluding the corporation from denying that the
proxy statement was false and misleading. 7 The Court so ruled
even though at common law mutuality of parties was required
before a party could be bound by a prior judgment, and the stock-
holders had not been parties to the SEC action."
In its 1996 decision in Markman, the Court held that the
Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial, though applicable to
patent-infringement actions, does not confer a right to have a
patent construed by a jury.69 The critical question, the Court said,
was "whether the particular trial decision must fall to the jury in
order to preserve the substance of the common-law right as it ex-
isted in 1791.'o To answer the question, the Court explained,
"the sounder course, when available, is to classify a mongrel prac-
tice.., by using the historical method, much as we do in charac-
61 Colgrove, 413 US at 155.
Id at 155-56 (footnotes omitted).
"Id at 157.
6Id.
6 439 US 322 (1979).
Id at 324-25.
Id at 337.
See id at 335-37.
116 S Ct at 1389, 1396.
'0 Id at 1389.
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terizing the suits and actions within which they arise."7 If an
"exact antecedent" is lacking, "the best hope lies in comparing the
modern practice to earlier ones whose allocation to court or jury
we do know,... seeking the best analogy we can between an old
and the new."72
Gasperini, the Court's most recent Seventh Amendment de-
cision, is also instructive, although it involved the Re-
examination Clause rather than the Jury Trial Clause. 7" At issue
was the permissibility of appellate review of the denial of a mo-
tion to set aside a jury verdict as excessive.74 In several opinions
from the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the Court
had interpreted the Seventh Amendment to bar such review. 5 In
Gasperini, however, the Court held such review to be "reconcil-
able with the Seventh Amendment as a control necessary and
proper to the fair administration of justice."7" The Court cited no
precedent for the practice in eighteenth century English law. In-
stead, the Court indicated that the meaning of the Seventh
Amendment was not frozen in 1791:
If the meaning of the Seventh Amendment were fixed at
1791, our civil juries would remain, as they unquestionably
were at common law, 'twelve good men and true' .... But see
Colgrove v. Battin (six-member jury for civil trial satisfies
Seventh Amendment's guarantee). Procedures we have re-
garded as compatible with the Seventh Amendment, al-
though not in conformity with practice at common law when
the Amendment was adopted, include new trials restricted to
the determination of damages, and Federal Rule of Civil Pro-
cedure 50(b)'s motion for judgment as a matter of law.77
71 Id at 1390.
Id (citations omitted).
See 116 S Ct at 2222.
, Id at 2216-17. The verdict in Gasperini was for compensatory damages only.
7See, for example, Lincoln v Power, 151 US 436, 437-38 (1894); Railroad Co v Fraloff,
100 US 24, 31-32 (1879).
116 S Ct at 2223.
Id at 2224 n 20 (citations omitted). See also id at 2225-30 (Stevens dissenting) (dis-
agreeing with the majority on another issue, but agreeing that the Seventh Amendment
did not bar appellate review and stating that "[tihere is nothing in its history or language
to suggest that the Amendment had any purpose but to preserve the essentials of the jury
trial as it was known to the common law before the adoption of the Constitution," quoting
Dimick, 293 US at 490 (Stone dissenting)). "Judgment as a matter of law" is the term
added to FRCP 50 in 1991, replacing the terms "directed verdict" and "judgment notwith-
standing the verdict" in federal practice. 28 USCA Rule 50 (1992 & Supp 1997) (Advisory
Committee notes).
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The principle that the Seventh Amendment preserves only
the most fundamental incidents of the English jury-trial system
has greatly restricted the reach of the Amendment. The impact of
the fundamental-elements principle can be seen today in matters
as basic as the number of jurors in the jury box; motions made
before, during, and after trial; and the scope of appellate review.
II. SUPREME COURT CASES PURPORTEDLY ESTABLISHING THE
RIGHT TO HAVE A JURY SET PUNITIVE DAMAGES
Some courts and commentators have suggested that certain
decisions of the Supreme Court involving awards of damages es-
tablish that the Seventh Amendment right to jury trial extends to
determining the amount of punitive damages. This Part shows
why those cases do not resolve this issue.
A. Barry v Edmunds
The Supreme Court's 1886 decision in Barry v Edmunds"
has been cited as authority that the Seventh Amendment confers
a right to have a jury set punitive damages.79 The Court held that
an action for trespass should not have been dismissed by the trial
court for failure to satisfy the federal amount-in-controversy re-
quirement, which at that time was $500."0 The trial court had ex-
plained that "if the jury should render a verdict for ($500) five
hundred dollars damages such verdict would be excessive, and
the court would feel compelled to set it aside."8' The Supreme
Court concluded that, to the contrary, a jury could award more
than $500, because the value of the horse forcibly taken from the
plaintiff by the defendant ($100) "would not necessarily cover [the
plaintiff's] actual, direct, and immediate pecuniary loss,"s2 and
because the jury could award punitive damages.83
Of particular pertinence is the following passage in the Su-
preme Court's opinion:
There was clear error in the Circuit Court in its ruling, as
matter of law, that there could be no lawful recovery.., of
an amount equal to that which is necessary to support the
" 116 US 550 (1886).
, See, for example, Henderson By Hartsfield v Alabama Power Co, 627 S2d 878, 888-
91 (Ala 1993).
See Barry, 116 US at 565.
"Id at 558.




jurisdiction of the court. The same error was repeated in
acting upon the statement, that a verdict, if rendered for
that amount, would be excessive and set aside for that rea-
son-a statement which could not, at any rate, be judicially
made before such a verdict was in fact rendered. It adds, in-
deed, to the principal error, if any distinction can be made,
that which consists in encroaching upon the province of the
jur..... [I]n such cases as the present, and other actions for
torts where no precise rule of law fixes the recoverable dam-
ages, it is the peculiar function of the jury to determine the
amount by their verdict .... [A] verdict will not be set aside
in a case of tort for excessive damages "unless the court can
clearly see that the jury have committed some very gross and
palpable error, or have acted under some improper bias, in-
fluence or prejudice, or have totally mistaken the rules of
law by which the damages are to be regulated"-that is,
"unless the verdict is so excessive or outrageous," with refer-
ence to all the circumstances of the case, "as to demonstrate
that the jury have acted against the rules of law, or have suf-
fered their passions, their prejudices, or their perverse disre-
gard of justice to mislead them." In no case is it permissible
for the court to substitute itself for the jury, and compel a
compliance on the part of the latter with its own view of the
facts in evidence, as the standard and measure of that jus-
tice, which the jury itself is the appointed constitutional tri-
bunal to award.'
It is clear from the parts of the opinion immediately preceding"
and following this passage8" that the "damages" referred to in-
cluded punitive as well as compensatory damages. Therefore, the
Court's statement that "the jury itself is the appointed constitu-
tional tribunal to award" damages" could be read to mean that
the Jury Trial Clause entitles a party to have a jury determine
the amount of punitive damages.
Id at 565 (latter emphasis added), quoting Whipple v Cumberland Manufacturing
Co, 29 F Cases 934,937-38,2 Story 661, 670 (Cir Ct D Me 1843).
"Barry, 116 US at 562 ("It is equally clear... that the plaintiff is not limited in his
recovery to the mere value of the property taken," and may "be entitled to exemplary
damages.").
' Id at 566 ("e dignity and value of the rights assailed, and the power and authority
of the source from which the assault proceeds, are elements to be considered in the compu-
tation of damages, not only compensation for the direct loss inflicted, but a remedy and
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But, consider6d in its entirety, Barry does not so hold.
Whether compensatory damages or punitive damages were to be
determined by a jury if the case proceeded to trial was not at is-
sue; the trial court had explicitly assumed that damages would be
for the jury to assess if the case were tried."8 The trial court had
nevertheless dismissed the action because it had concluded that
any jury verdict of more than $500 would have been excessive.8 9
The Court's statement that "the jury itself is the appointed con-
stitutional tribunal to award" damages followed a discussion that
focused on the limitations of a court's power to set aside as exces-
sive a jury's verdict in a tort action." The statement thus appears
to have been made with reference to the Re-examination Clause
rather than the Jury Trial Clause. The Court also spoke gener-
ally of damages in tort, and did not specifically address punitive
damages.9'
B. Curtis v Loether
Eighty-eight years after Barry, the Court addressed the right
to a jury trial in another case involving a prayer for punitive
damages. But, again, it did not hold that there was a right to
have the jury set those damages.
In Curtis v Loether,"2 an African-American woman alleged
that two white men had refused to rent her an apartment be-
cause of her race, in violation of Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1968.9' Her complaint sought injunctive relief and punitive
See id at 558.
See id.
® Id at 565.
" In Defender Industries, Inc v Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Co, 938 F2d 502
(4th Cir 1991) (en bane), the Fourth Circuit cited Kennon v Gilmer, 131 US 22 (1889), to
support its conclusion that the Seventh Amendment right to jury trial extends to the
amount of punitive damages. 938 F2d at 506. In Kennon, a jury awarded compensatory
damages of $20,750. On appeal, the territorial supreme court held that the damages were
excessive and reduced the judgment to $10,750, without allowing the plaintiff to choose a
new trial instead. 131 US at 24. The United States Supreme Court held that this reduc-
tion violated the Seventh Amendment. 131 US at 27-30. For two reasons, Kennon does not
indicate that the Seventh Amendment entitles a party to a jury determination of the
amount of punitive damages. First, there is no indication that the case involved an award
of punitive damages. Second, what issues were triable to a jury was not in question; the
issue of damages had been submitted to the jury. The Supreme Court's decision was based
on the appellate court's action in substituting its estimate of the damages for the jury's
and not affording the plaintiff the opportunity for a new trial if he found unacceptable
whatever remittitur the court ordered. See 131 US at 29-30. Kennon is properly under-
stood as a decision based on the Re-examination Clause rather than the Jury Trial Clause.
415 US 189, 189-90 (1974).
42 USC § 3604(a) (1994).
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damages (which the statute permitted in the amount of $1,000 or
less). The prayer for injunctive relief was decided before trial, and
at trial the plaintiff sought to recover compensatory as well as
punitive damages. 4 The trial court refused the defendants' re-
quest for a jury trial. 5 After a bench trial, it found no actual
damages but awarded $250 in punitive damages.9
The Supreme Court held that the defendants should have
been afforded a jury trial. "The Seventh Amendment does apply,"
the Court declared, "to actions enforcing statutory rights, and re-
quires a jury trial upon demand, if the statute creates legal rights
and remedies, enforceable in an action for damages in the ordi-
nary courts of law."97
The Court concluded that the action was one to enforce "legal
rights."98 First, "[a] damages action under the statute sounds ba-
sically in tort--the statute merely defines a new legal duty," and
the cause of action is "analogous to a number of tort actions rec-
ognized at common law."99 Second, and according to the Court
more important, "the relief sought here-actual and punitive
damages-is the traditional form of relief offered in the courts of
law."'" The Court also commented that, whatever might be the
merit of circuit court decisions that had characterized backpay
awarded in Title VII employment discrimination cases as "equi-
table," "there is surely no basis for characterizing the award of
compensatory and punitive damages here as equitable relief."'
Like Barry, Curtis does not establish that the Seventh
Amendment entitles a party to have a jury set punitive damages.
In Curtis the trial court had decided all issues without a jury-
including whether the defendants had discriminated against the
plaintiff because of her race, whether she had suffered actual
damages, whether punitive damages were warranted, and if so
what the amount of punitive damages should be.0 2 In holding
that the defendants had been improperly derped a jury trial, the
Supreme Court did not specify whether a judge or a jury should
determine the amount of punitive damages.'






"0Id at 196 (footnote omitted).
101 Id at 197 (footnote omitted).
'"See id at 191.
'"See id at 198.
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In defending the denial of a jury trial, the plaintiff had
stressed in the Supreme Court that the only damages she sought
in her complaint were punitive damages."' Significantly, the
Court did not state that it made no difference whether only puni-
tive damages were sought, but instead noted that the plaintiff
"later sought to recover actual damages as well," that the pretrial
order listed actual damages as an issue to be tried, and that at
trial the plaintiff unsuccessfully attempted to prove such dam-
ages. 10
5
In distinguishing fair housing actions under Title VIII from
employment actions for reinstatement and backpay under Title
VII (which several courts of appeals had held did not trigger the
right to a jury trial),' 6 the Curtis Court stressed that "the deci-
sion whether to award backpay is committed to the discretion of
the trial judge," whereas "[t]here is no comparable discretion [un-
der Title VIII]: if a plaintiff proves unlawful discrimination and
actual damages, he is entitled to judgment for that amount."'
The Court's distinction depended on the presence of a claim for
actual damages. Furthermore, in this respect punitive damages
are similar to backpay under Title VII, not to actual damages un-
der Title VIII. Punitive damages are awarded as a matter of dis-
cretion; there is no entitlement to them.0 8
The Court also stated that "[w]e need not, and do not, go so
far as to say that any award of monetary relief must necessarily
be 'legal' relief."' 9 Immediately following that statement, the
Court cited two of its prior decisions and, in a footnote, page 414
of the Fifth Circuit's decision in Swofford v B & W, Inc."° The
Fifth Circuit stated there that the Supreme Court's decisions in
Beacon Theatres, Inc v Westover" and Dairy Queen, Inc v Wood".
10 See id at 190 n 1.
105Id.
"See id at 196 & n 13. In 1991, Title VII was amended to permit recovery of compen-
satory and punitive damages, and to afford a right to a jury trial when damages are
sought. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub L No 102-166, § 102, 105 Stat 1071 (1991), codified
at 42 USC § 1981a (1994).
"Curtis, 415 US at 197.
"See, for example, Restatement (Second) of Torts § 908 comment d (1979); Shepherd
Components, Inc v Brice Petrides-Donohue & Associates, Inc, 473 NW2d 612, 619 (Iowa
1991) (We have stated that punitive damages are not allowed as a matter of right and are
discretionary."); Alabama Power Co v Rembert, 282 Ala 5, 208 S2d 205, 206 (1968) ("Puni-
tive damages are not recoverable as a matter of right except as provided by statute.").
'Curtis, 415 US at 196.
1 336 F2d 406, 414 (5th Cir 1964). The other cases cited were Mitchell v De Mario
Jewelry, Inc, 361 US 288 (1960), and Porter v Warner Holding Co, 328 US 395 (1946).
.. 359 US 500 (1959).
11369 US 469 (1962).
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had not "converted typical non-jury claims, or remedies, into jury
ones" and had not "suddenly converted any money request into a
money claim triable by jury.""' Moreover, the Swofford court had
made those statements in support of its conclusion that "exem-
plary damages and attorneys' fees are not money claims triable
by jury, although they are awarded in a 'legal' action." 4
The Supreme Court's citation of Swofford, together with the
care the Court took to point out that the issue of actual damages
had been tried,"5 suggests that the Court did not intend to decide
whether there is a right to have a jury set punitive damages.
III. TULL V UNITED STATES
Not only has the Supreme Court never held that the Seventh
Amendment guarantees a right to a jury trial on the amount of
punitive damages, but in its 1987 decision in Tull v United
States, the Court ruled that the Seventh Amendment does not
entitle a defendant to have a jury determine the amount of a civil
penalty. 11
6
Tull involved an action by the federal government against a
real estate developer, Edward Tull, for a civil penalty under the
Clean Water Act ("CWA). 117 The government sought a penalty of
nearly $23 million."' The trial court denied Tull's demand for a
jury trial and, after a bench trial, held him liable and assessed a
penalty of $325,000.1"
In an opinion by Justice Brennan, the Supreme Court held
that Tull had a right to a jury trial on his liability for a penalty,20
but not on the amount of the penalty. 2' It was permissible, the
Court ruled, for Congress to vest trial judges with the power to
set the amount of penalties under the CWA."2 The Court ex-
plained that having the jury "determine the remedy in a trial in
"
0 Swofford, 336 F2d at 414.
... Id at 413 (emphasis added). Swofford involved a claim of patent infringement, but
the court's holding that there was no right to a jury trial on exemplary damages was based
on the nature of that remedy, not on the nature of the claim; the court specifically noted
that "[a] claim for damages based upon a charge of infringement of patent is plainly a
'legal' claim.n " Id at 410 n 5. The opinion in Swofford was written by Judge Rives and
joined by Chief Judge Tattle and Judge Wisdom.
" See Curtis, 415 US at 190 n 1.
116481 US at 426-27.
11733 USC § 1319(d) (1994). See Tul, 481 US at 414.
1 Tull, 481 US at 415.
lId.
Id at 424-25.
-x Id at 425-27.
m Id at 426-27.
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which it must determine liability" is not "necessary" "to preserve
the 'substance of the common law right of trial by jury."' In a
footnote, the Court added the very broad statement that
"Inlothing in the Amendment's language suggests that the right
to a jury trial extends to the remedy phase of a civil trial."' The
Court said it had been "presented with no evidence that the
Framers meant to extend the right to a jury to the remedy phase
of a civil trial." "a
The Court went on to explain:
The assessment of a civil penalty is not one of the "most fun-
damental elements." Congress' authority to fix the penalty
by statute has not been questioned, and it was also the Brit-
ish practice. In the United States, the action to recover civil
penalties usually seeks the amount fixed by Congress. The
assessment of civil penalties thus cannot be said to involve
the "substance of a common-law right to a trial by jury," nor
a "fundamental element of a jury trial." 26
The Court added two other justifications for its conclusion that
Tul had no right to have a jury determine his penalty. First,
"[since Congress itself may fix the civil penalties, it may delegate
that determination to trial judges."27 Second, "[i]n this case,
highly discretionary calculations that take into account multiple
factors are necessary in order to set civil penalties under the
Clean Water Act. These are the kinds of calculations traditionally
performed by judges."'
Although Thul involved a statutory civil penalty rather than
punitive damages, the Court's opinion specifically notes that "the
remedy of civil penalties is similar to the remedy of punitive
damages, another legal remedy that is not a fixed fine." ' More-
'Id at 425-26 (footnotes omitted), quoting Colgrove, 413 US at 157.
1 481 US at 426 n 9.
..Id.
"'Id at 426 (citations omitted).
'"Id at 427.
'Id, citing Albemarle Paper Co v Moody, 422 US 405, 442-43 (1975) (Rehnquist con-
curring). In his concurring opinion in Albemarle, Justice Rehnquist suggested that if
backpay were routinely awarded under Title VII upon a finding of discrimination, rather
than on a case-by-case basis in the discretion of the court, the right to a jury trial would be
triggered. 422 US at 443. (In 1991, Congress amended Title VII to provide a right to a jury
trial whenever damages are sought. See note 106.)
481 US at 422 n 7. See also id at 422 (describing punitive damages as an example of
a remedy "intended to punish culpable individuals" that was "issued by courts of law, not
courts of equity"); Minneapolis and St Louis Railway Co v Beckwith, 129 US 26, 36 (1889)
(describing punitive damages as "one mode of imposing a penalty for the violation of
duty"). The statements in Tull about punitive damages appear in the part of the opinion
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over, while two dissenting Justices argued that the decision was
inconsistent with the traditional treatment of punitive dam-
ages, 30 the majority did not distinguish punitive damages or indi-
cate that its decision would have no impact on claims for punitive
damages. When Tull was decided, the Supreme Court had begun
to devote increasing attention to cases involving large awards of
punitive damages.'' The Court surely would have been aware of
the potential implications of its decision for punitive damages;
indeed, its broad language questioning whether the right to jury
trial extends to the determination of remedies at all"3 2 may well
have been included for the very purpose of inviting a rethinking
of the treatment of punitive damages. In light of Tull, as well as
the recent statement of three Justices that "the level of punitive
damages is not really a 'fact' tried' by the jury,"'3 whether a
party has a right under the Seventh Amendment to have a jury
set punitive damages is very much an open question."3
holding that the defendant had a right to have a jury decide his liability for a penalty. 481
US at 422-25.
'See 481 US at 428 (Scalia, joined by Stevens, concurring in part and dissenting in
part) ("I can recall no precedent for judgment of civil liability by jury but assessment of
amount by the court. Even punitive damages are assessed by the jury when liability is
determined in that fashion.").
"'Three weeks before Tall was decided, the Court decided a case involving what was
then the largest punitive damages award ever, a $3 billion award against Texaco. See
Pennzoil Co v Texaco, Inc, 481 US 1, 4 (1987). See also Bankers Life & Casualty Co v
Crenshaw, 480 US 915 (1987) (noting probable jurisdiction in case involving constitutional
challenges to $1.6 million punitive award), decided on other grounds, 486 US 71, 80
(1988); Aetna Life Insurance Co v Lavoie, 475 US 813, 816 (1986) (involving a $3.5 million
punitive award).
See Tull, 481 US at 425-26.
'Gasperini, 116 S Ct at 2235 (Scalia, joined by Rehnquist and Thomas, dissenting).
See Colleen P. Murphy, Integrating the Constitutional Authority of Civil and Crimi-
nal Juries, 61 Geo Wash L Rev 723, 803 (1993) (arguing that the Seventh Amendment
does not require that a jury determine the amount of punitive damages). In 1989, two
years after Tull, a panel of the Fourth Circuit held, in Shamblin's Ready Mix, Inc v Eaton
Corp, 873 F2d 736, 742 (4th Cir 1989) (opinion by Butzner), that there is no right to a jury
trial on the amount of punitive damages. In 1991, the Fourth Circuit, sitting en banc,
overruled Shamblin's. Defender Industries, Inc v Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Co,
938 F2d 502, 507 (4th Cir 1991). In Defender Industries, the trial court, upon finding the
jury's punitive damages award to be grossly excessive, had not followed the familiar pro-
cedure of ordering a new trial unless the plaintiff accepted a remittitur, but instead had
ordered that judgment be entered in a reduced amount. Id at 505. Because the jury had
been asked to return a verdict assessing punitive damages, with no suggestion that the
verdict would be simply advisory, the Fourth Circuit could have overturned the trial
court's ruling solely on the basis of the Re-examination Clause. Compare Browning-Ferris
Industries of Vermont, Inc v Kelco Disposal, Inc, 492 US 257, 280 & n 26 (1989) (relying in
part on Seventh Amendment in according considerable deference to trial court's denial of
new trial motion in case involving large punitive damages award). But the Fourth Circuit
went further, concluding that "assessment by a jury of the amount of punitive damages is
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IV. PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN EIGHTEENTH CENTURY ENGLAND
Since the existence of a right to have a jury set punitive
damages is an open question under Supreme Court precedent,
the critical questions are whether jury determination of the
amount of punitive damages was within "the 'substance of the
common law right of trial by jury,""' and was one of the "most
fundamental elements""3 6 of the jury-trial system in eighteenth
century England. While the vagueness of these formulations
means that their application to specific issues will almost always
be debatable, they would appear to indicate that there is no right
under the Seventh Amendment to have a jury set punitive dam-
ages.
A. Absence of Right to Have a Jury Determine Damages
In his opinion for the Court in Tull, Justice Brennan strongly
questioned whether the Seventh Amendment was intended to
guarantee a right to a jury in "the remedy phase of a civil trial,"'37
but failed to cite any authority suggesting that the Jury Trial
Clause was not intended to apply to determinations of remedy.
Perhaps because of the terseness of the Court's discussion, this
part of Tull has not been accorded much significance in subse-
quent cases in the lower federal courts or in state courts con-
cerning the existence of a right to have a jury set punitive dam-
ages.138
The distinction suggested in Tull does in fact find support in
the English common law. The common-law allocation of responsi-
bility to determine damages calls into question whether the Sev-
enth Amendment even guarantees the right to have a jury set
compensatory damages, let alone punitive damages.
an inherent and fundamental element of the common-law right to trial by jury." 938 F2d
at 507. See also Johnson v Hugo's Skateway, 974 F2d 1408, 1416 (4th Cir 1992) (en bane);
Mattison v Dallas Carrier Corp, 947 F2d 95, 107-08 (4th Cir 1991).
More recently, a Fourth Circuit panel has relied upon Tull, notwithstanding Defender
Industries, in adopting a novel and more demanding standard to govern post-trial review
of punitive damages awards. Atlas Food Systems and Services v Crane National Vendors,
99 F3d 587, 594-95 (4th Cir 1996) (discussed in note 9).
" Tull, 481 US at 426, quoting Colgrove, 413 US at 157.
'Galloway, 319 US at 392.
' 481 US at 426 n 9.
"See, for example, Defender Industries, 938 F2d at 506 (noting that "Tull does con-
tain some rather broad language," but concluding that Tll "cannot stand for the proposi-
tion that a plaintiff bringing a state common-law cause of action does not have a right to a
jury determination of the amount of punitive damages").
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In jury trials at common law, the jury could award dam-
ages.'39 When it did so, the amount of its award was subject to
only limited review.4 ° But there was no right to have damages
determined in a trial by jury.
Damages were frequently assessed in a separate proceeding
conducted by a sheriff rather than in a trial by jury. This sepa-
rate proceeding was held when a plaintiff obtained an interlocu-
tory judgment by confession, default, or the overruling of a de-
murrer.' Following the interlocutory judgment, damages were
determined pursuant to a writ of inquiry.' A writ of inquiry was
issued by the court in which the action was pending and was exe-
cuted by the sheriff. It stated that "the plaintiff ought to recover
his damages .... But because it is unknown what damages he
hath sustained... , the sheriff is commanded, that by the oath of
twelve honest and lawful men of his county, he diligently inquire
the same; and return the inquisition into court."'43 The inquest
jury sometimes had more than twelve members.'
When a writ of inquiry was executed, the inquiry into dam-
ages was conducted before the sheriff or an undersheriff.45 Ac-
cording to one estimate, in the seventeenth century there were
five times as many inquiries into damages before sheriffs as there
were trials involving damages before nisi prius judges. 4 '
The English courts recognized that there was "a difference
between a principal verdict of a jury, and a writ of inquiry of
" See, for example, Grey v Grant, 2 Wils KB 251, 95 Eng Rep 794, 795 (KB 1764).
"See Sharpe v Brice, 2 Black W 942, 96 Eng Rep 557, 557 (CP 1774); Beardmore v
Carrington, 2 Wils KB 244,95 Eng Rep 790, 793 (KB 1764).
' See Clinton W. Francis, The Structure of Judicial Administration and the Develop-
ment of Contract Law in Seventeenth Century England, 83 Colum L Rev 35, 64 & n 139
(1983); Thomas Chitty, 2 Archibold's Practice of the Courts of Queen's Bench in Personal
Actions and Ejectment 930, 982-86 (H. Sweet 11th ed 1862). If, however, issues of fact
were tried to a jury before the argument on a demurrer and resolved in the plaintiffs fa-
vor, the jury trying such issues would also assess damages. James Stephen, Lush's Prac-
tice of the Superior Courts of Common Law at Westminster 596 (C. Reader 2d ed 1856).
"See William Blackstone, 3 Commentaries on the Laws of England 397-98 (Chicago
1979); Francis, 83 Colum L Rev at 64. An exception developed in the eighteenth century
for actions in which the damages could be calculated with certainty. Damages in such
cases were calculated by a court officer. See Clinton W. Francis, Practice, Strategy, and
Institution: Debt Collection in the English Common-Law Courts, 1740-1840, 80 Nw U L
Rev 807, 815 n 20 (1986); Chitty, 2 Archibold's Practice at 983-84.
"'William Tidd, 1 The Practice of the Courts of King's Bench and Common Pleas 573
(Robert E. Small 4th ed 1856).
'"See, for example, Proceedings on a Writ of Inquiry of Damages between His Royal
Highness James Duke of York, in an Action upon the Statute de Scandals Magnatum, and
Titus Oates, 3 St Trials 987, 987 (KB 1684) (inquest jury comprised of fifteen men).
,'See Francis, 83 Colum L Rev at 64; Chitty, 2 Archibold's Practice at 987.
",See Francis, 83 Colum L Rev at 64.
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damages; the latter being only an inquest of office to inform the
conscience of the Court, and which they might have assessed
themselves without any inquest at all."147 It was recognized that
courts, "if they please, may themselves assess the damages.""
Although courts seldom set aside a verdict returned pursuant to a
writ of inquiry,'4 9 their power to assess damages themselves
without an inquest was not questioned. 50
At common law, when a defendant contested liability but did
not file a demurrer, damages as well as liability were decided in a
jury trial. 5' But the practice following default, confession of
judgment, and overruling of a demurrer suggests that in other
cases damages were decided by a jury as a matter of convenience,
rather than because a party was deemed to have a right to have a
jury assess them.5 2
The case law in this country concerning defaults supports
this interpretation. In 1797, in a case in which a federal trial
.'Beardmore, 95 Eng Rep at 792. See also Bruce v Rawlins, 3 Wils KB 61, 95 Eng Rep
934, 934 (KB 1770); Hewit v Mantel, 2 Wils KB 372, 95 Eng Rep 868, 870 (KB 1768).
"Bruce, 95 Eng Rep at 934. See Hewit, 95 Eng Rep at 870; Beardmore, 95 Eng Rep at
792; Chitty, 2 Archibold's Practice at 992-93 (cited in note 141). See also Welch v Tennessee
Valley Authority, 108 F2d 95, 99 (6th Cir 1939) ("Courts of England, at the time of the
adoption of the Constitution, did not lack the power to fix damages in many cases at com-
mon law. They frequently fixed the amount on judgment by default and on demurrer.");
Editorial, Assessment of Damages Upon Default, 7 Yale L J 311, 311 (1898) ("At common
law, upon a default, the assessment of damages, whether liquidated or unliquidated, was
never referable of right to a jury.").
"See Francis, 83 Colum L Rev at 90-91 (cited in note 141). See also Burges v Nightin-
gale, Barnes 230, 94 Eng Rep 890, 890 (CP 1736) ("Where the jury find any damages, the
inquisition must stand.").
"In Dimick v Schiedt, 293 US 474 (1935), Justice Sutherland's opinion for the Court
discussed writs of inquiry as follows:
The power of the court to increase or diminish damages assessed upon a writ of in-
quiry was likewise upheld; but this upon the ground that the justices might them-
selves have awarded damages without the writ, and the inquisition, therefore, was
nothing more than an inquest for their information. But even this rule seems long
since to have fallen into disuse, the more modem practice being to award a new writ
of inquiry in all cases in which the court would award a new trial.
Id at 478-79 (citations omitted). The Court did not suggest that as of 1791 any question
had been raised as to the power of English judges to assess damages themselves without a
writ of inquiry, or that the English courts had recognized a right to have damages as-
sessed in a jury trial rather than pursuant to a writ of inquiry.
" See Tullidge v Wade, 3 Wils KB 18, 95 Eng Rep 909, 909 (KB 1769).
'See Raymond v Danbury & AR Co, 20 F Cases 332, 333 (Cir Ct D Conn 1877) ("The
assessment of damages by a jury, in actions, of tort, was.., a matter of practice, and not
of right."); Pierre v Eastern Air Lines, Inc, 152 F Supp 486, 488 (D NJ 1957) ("At common
law the assessment of damages in a default, in tort and in contract, was not considered a
flmction of the jury and stood upon a different footing from the trial of issues of fact. The




court assessed damages itself after a default, the Supreme Court
affirmed the judgment, 5 ' necessarily rejecting the defendant's
claim that damages should have been assessed by the jury.TM The
defendant had relied upon the provision of the Judiciary Act of
1789 requiring that all issues of fact be decided by a jury. '55
Similarly, the lower federal courts have almost uniformly
held that the Seventh Amendment does not confer a right to have
a jury determine damages after a default.5 ' The rule that there is
no right to a jury trial after a default has been applied not just
against defaulting defendants, but against plaintiffs seeking a
jury trial on damages after a defendant's default. 5 7 These deci-
sions thus cannot be attributed to an unstated doctrine of waiver
or forfeiture; they instead are a latter-day reflection of the ab-
sence at common law of a right to a jury trial on damages.
B. Considerations Peculiar to Punitive Damages
The absence at common law of a right to have the amount of
damages decided by a jury suggests that it might even be consis-
tent with the Seventh Amendment for federal judges to deter-
mine the amount of compensatory damages. 55 But whether or not
See Brown v Van Braam, 3 US (3 Dall) 344,356 (1797).
See id at 347-48 (stating defendant's claim).
See id at 352, citing An Act to regulate Processes in the Courts of the United States,
§ 34, 1 Stat 92 (1789).
'See Goldman, Antonetti, Ferraiuoli, Axtmayer & Hertell v Medfit International, Inc,
982 F2d 686, 692 n 15 (1st Cir 1993); Adriana International Corp v Thoeren, 913 F2d
1406, 1414 (9th Cir 1990); Eisler v Strizler, 535 F2d 148, 153 (1st Cir 1976); Henry v
Sneiders, 490 F2d 315, 318 (9th Cir 1974); Midland Contracting Co v Toledo Foundry &
Machine Co, 154 F 797, 799-800 (7th Cir 1907) (discussing Seventh Amendment rights,
although deciding case on state-law grounds); Frankart Distributors, Inc v Levitz, 796 F
Supp 75, 76 (E D NY 1992); Kormes v Weis, Voisin & Co, Inc, 61 FRD 608, 609 (E D Pa
1974); Gill v Stolow, 18 FRD 508, 510 (S D NY 1955), revd on other grounds, 240 F2d 669,
670 (2d Cir 1957). See FRCP 55(bX2) (providing for jury trial on the issue of damages after
a default only when required by a federal statute). But see Byrd v Keene Corp, 104 FRD
10, 12 (E D Pa 1984) (noting that although the decision whether to enter a default judg-
ment is left to the courts discretion, the "parties may exercise their statutory and consti-
tutional right to jury trial at that hearing").
'See Benz v Skiba, Skiba & Glomski, 164 FRD 115, 116 (D Me 1995); Johnson v
Bridgeport Deoxidized Bronze & Metal Co, 125 F 631, 632 (Cir Ct D Conn 1903); Ray-
mond, 20 F Cases at 333-34. See In re Dierschke, 975 F2d 181, 185 (5th Cir 1992) ("It is
also 'clear... that in a default case neither the plaintiff nor the defendant has a constitu-
tional right to jury trial on the issue of damages," quoting James W. Moore, 5 Moore's
Federal Practice § 38.19[3] (Matthew Bender 1996)).
"In Dimick v Schiedt, 293 US 474 (1935), however, which held that additur violates
the Re-examination Clause, the five-Justice majority stated that, when a verdict is exces-
sive or inadequate, "both parties remain entitled as they were entitled in the first instance,
to have a jury properly determine the question of liability and the extent of the injury by
an assessment of damages." Id at 486 (emphasis added). (Dimick did not involve an award
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such a practice would be permissible, there are considerations
peculiar to punitive damages that confirm that the Seventh
Amendment should not be interpreted to require that punitive
damages be set by juries.
First, the English cases prior to 1791 that endorsed punitive
damages (which were then referred to as exemplary damages)
spoke of the power of the jury to award such damages, not of any
right of a party to have a jury set them. For example, in Wilkes v
Wood,"5 9 the Court of King's Bench stated that "a jury have it in
their power to give damages for more than the injury received."
Moreover, punitive damages were not restricted to jury trials. In
Benson v Frederick,' one of the early decisions upholding a dam-
age award in excess of the plaintiff's loss, the damages had been
determined not in a trial by jury but in an inquest before a jury
pursuant to a writ of inquiry.
The absence of English authority recognizing a right to have
a jury determine the amount of punitive damages is not surpris-
ing in light of the English practice in criminal cases. Judges, not
juries, determined sentences (though juries sometimes refused to
find the defendant guilty because of concern about the harsh
punishment he could face if convicted).' 6' Since there was no right
to have a jury determine the degree of punishment in criminal
cases-where a defendant's life or liberty was at stake-it would
have been anomalous to recognize a right to have a monetary
punishment fixed by a jury.
Second, although the common law had developed over sev-
eral centuries, punitive damages were first recognized in 1763."62
The awards of punitive damages returned in jury trials in a num-
ber of cases between 1763 and 1791 hardly made jury determina-
tion of such damages one of the most fundamental elements of
the jury-trial system."63
of punitive damages.) In 1791, compensation was also a basic and long-established pur-
pose of common law causes of action. See, for example, Anonymous, YB 6 Edw 4, fol 7, pl
18 (KB 1466). A powerful argument can be made that the jury's role would be impermissi-
bly trivialized if even compensatory damages were determined by the judge.
6 Lofft 1, 98 Eng Rep 489, 498 (CP 1763).
163 Burr 1845, 97 Eng Rep 1130, 1130 (KB 1766).
... See Leon Radzinowicz, 1 A History of English Criminal Law and its Administration
from 1750 93-95 (Stevens 1948) (discussing acquittals in cases involving small offenses
punishable by death).
" See Wilkes, 98 Eng Rep at 498; Huckle v Money, 2 Wils KB 205, 95 Eng Rep 768, 769
(KB 1763).
" In Defender Industries, Inc v Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Co, 938 F2d 502,
507 (4th Cir 1991) (en banc), the Fourth Circuit cited, as support for its conclusion that
the Seventh Amendment confers a right to have a jury set punitive damages, the Supreme
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As the Supreme Court stressed in Galloway v United States,
the rules of the common law "were constantly changing and de-
veloping during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centu-
ries."' Because capacity for change was an inherent part of the
common law, the common law of England in 1791 possessed the
capacity to adopt changes in the procedures for resolving par-
ticular issues, including punitive damages. Since punitive dam-
ages were only a recent arrival on the legal scene, had not been
awarded exclusively in jury trials, and had not been declared to
be triable to a jury as of right," it is not reasonable to interpret a
constitutional amendment preserving the right of trial by jury in
suits "at common law" as forever requiring that juries set such
damages.
Third, there are important differences between punitive
damages under modern American law and punitive damages un-
der eighteenth century English law. As Professor Charles
McCormick noted, "[i]t is only in America that the cases clearly
have separated exemplary from compensatory damages."'66 In
this country punitive damages are the subject of separate instruc-
tions, and in nearly all states the jury, if it chooses to award such
damages, identifies in its verdict separate sums for compensatory
and punitive damages. In contrast, in eighteenth century Eng-
land, punitive damages typically were not a separate element of
recovery. In Huckle v Money,' one of the first cases to recognize
such damages, the jury returned an undifferentiated verdict of
£300. Lord Camden had instructed the jurors that "they were not
bound to any certain damages"; there was no instruction to con-
sider separately what damages the jurors might deem appropri-
Court's statement in Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co v Haslip, 499 US 1, 15 (1991), that
"[u]nder the traditional common-law approach, the amount of the punitive award is ini-
tially determined by a jury." In context, however, it is apparent that the Court's statement
in Haslip-which involved a challenge under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to a punitive damages award in a trial in state court not subject to the Sev-
enth Amendment-was not directed to the English common law, but to the common law in
the United States prior to the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment in, 1868. The Court
had no reason to consider, and there is no indication that it did consider, whether jury
determination of the amount of punitive damages was a significant part (if it was any part
at all) of the right to jury trial in eighteenth century England.
"319 US at 391 (footnote omitted). See also Gasperini, 116 S Ct at 2224 n 20 (mean-
ing of the Seventh Amendment not fixed as of 1791); Wolfram, 57 Minn L Rev at 736-37
(cited in note 26) (arguing that the understanding in 1791 of "common law" involved
"flexibility and capacity for growth in order to respond to changing social pressures").
"See text accompanying notes 139-53 and 159-64.
' Charles T. McCormick, Handbook on the Law of Damages 278 (West 1935).
" 2 Wils KB 205, 95 Eng Rep 768 (KB 1763).
"'Id at 769.
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ate as punishment. Similarly, the report of Wilkes v Wood, a re-
lated case in which the jury awarded £1000, indicates that Lord
Pratt gave instructions to the jury to the effect that
a jury have it in their power to give damages for more than
the injury received. Damages are designed not only as a sat-
isfaction to the injured person, but likewise as punishment
to the guilty, to deter from any such proceeding for the fu-
ture, and as a proof of the detestation of the jury to the ac-
tion itself."9
This instruction identified punishment as an additional purpose
of damages, but did not ask the jury to return a separate award of
punitive damages.
In several of the pre-1791 English cases that endorsed puni-
tive damages, not only were such damages not a distinct element
of recovery, but the rationale of punishment or setting an exam-
ple was blended with the compensatory rationale of remedying an
insult to the plaintiff. For example, in Tullidge v Wade,'7 ° the
court upheld a jury's verdict of £50 against a defendant who "got
[the plaintiffs daughter] with child." Again there is no indication
that the jury was instructed to consider what sum should be
awarded as punitive damages or as punishment. And two of the
three judges stressed the insult to the plaintiff in concluding that
the verdict should stand.'7'
C. Criminal Cases
A comparison to criminal cases is also instructive. Just as the
Seventh Amendment preserves the right to jury trial in civil
cases, both the Sixth Amendment and Article III, Section 2,
guarantee the right to jury trial in criminal cases. Indeed, the
Supreme Court has called the Sixth Amendment right to jury
1698 Eng Rep at 498-99.
1703 Wils KB 18, 95 Eng Rep 909, 909 (KB 1769).
"'See id at 909 (opinion by Wilmot) ("the plaintiff having received this insult in his
own house"), 910 (opinion by Bathurst) ("In actions of this nature, and of assaults, the
circumstances of time and place, when and where the insult is given, require different
damages."). See also Benson, 97 Eng Rep at 1130 (opinion by Lord Mansfield) (arguing
that the plaintiff, "though not much hurt indeed, was scandalized and disgraced"); Grey,
95 Eng Rep at 795 ("[Tlhe plaintiff has been used unlike a gentleman by the defendant.").
In 1935, Professor McCormick wrote that "[i]n England... it is still not entirely clear
whether the accepted theory [of punitive damages] is that they are a distinct and strictly
punitive element of the recovery, or they are merely a swollen or 'aggravated' allowance of
compensatory damages permitted in cases of outrage." McCormick, Handbook at 278
(cited in note 166) (footnote omitted).
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trial "fundamental to the American scheme of justice" and has
held that that right-unlike the Seventh Amendment right to
jury trial-must be honored in state as well as federal court.'72
But the Court also has held that the Sixth Amendment does
not give a criminal defendant a right to have a jury determine his
sentence.17 Even in a capital case, it is permissible to assign full
responsibility for deciding the defendant's sentence to the
judge.'74 If a citizen whose life or liberty is at stake does not have
a right to have a jury determine his punishment, it is difficult to
fathom why a citizen seeking punitive damages or seeking to
avoid their imposition should have a right to have a jury deter-
mine the amount.
V. THE REASONS WHY JUDGES RATHER THAN JURIES SHOULD
SET PUNITIVE DAMAGEs
If the Seventh Amendment does not dictate that juries set
punitive damages, then the allocation of power to set such dam-
ages, in cases brought in federal court, is a matter of policy. This
Part first will examine several considerations supporting alloca-
tion of this power to trial judges, and then show that the general
justifications for jury trials in civil cases do not outweigh those
considerations.
A. Policies Supporting Assessment of Punitive Damages
by Judges
More than a century ago, the Supreme Court of Texas ob-
served:
A power such as may be exercised by juries in awarding ex-
emplary damages is liable to great abuse,--may often lead to
great oppression .... In cases based on facts which merit
condemnation, or even punishment, though not by law con-
stituting crime, juries, under commendable impulses, but
with judgment warped by passion, no doubt often render ex-
cessive verdicts.'75
"Duncan v Louisiana, 391 US 145, 149 (1968).
'See Walton v Arizona, 497 US 639, 647-49 (1990); Hildwin v Florida, 490 US 638,
640-41 (1989) (per curiam); McMillan v Pennsylvania, 477 US 79, 93 (1986); Spaziano v
Florida, 468 US 447,459 (1984).
Walton, 497 US at 647-49; Hildwin, 490 US at 640-41.
'
7
'Tynberg v Cohen, 76 Tex 409, 13 SW 315, 317 (1890).
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This observation was made in support of the need to exercise,
"firmly and fearlessly," the power to grant a new trial when a
jury's punitive damages award is excessive, 176 but it also points to
a reason that judges are better equipped than juries to set puni-
tive damages in the first place. Just as the Supreme Court has
held that judges are better suited than juries to construe pat-
ents, 77 judges are also better suited to mete out punishment.
They are more likely to be able to base the severity of the penalty
on a rational assessment of the facts, rather than an emotional
reaction to the defendant's misconduct. As was said in an analy-
sis of the allocation of power to determine sentences in criminal
cases, "juries are more easily influenced by emotional factors
than judges, who, due to their experience, are better able to make
an objective determination of the penalty to be inflicted."78
It might be objected that the argument proves too much, for
emotional factors also may influence jury awards of compensatory
damages, yet juries are nevertheless asked to set compensatory
damages. But assigning the determination of punitive damages to
an emotion-prone decisionmaker is much more troubling than
assigning the determination of compensatory damages to such a
decisionmaker. In the words of the Supreme Court, punitive
damages are "private fines."179 But unlike criminal fines and civil
statutory penalties, they are generally not subject to any cap. 8 '
The criteria that govern the determination of the amount of puni-
tive damages confer enormous discretion. 8' Yet punitive damages
17 Id ([Tihere is no class of cases in which the conservatism of the judge should more
frequently find field for action.").
1See Markman, 116 S Ct at 1395 (holding that judges rather than juries should con-
strue patents in part because "a jury's capability to evaluate demeanor, to sense the
'mainsprings of human conduct,' or to reflect community standards, are much less signifi-
cant than a trained ability to evaluate the testimony in relation to the overall structure of
the patent") (citations omitted).
.. Comment, Consideration of Punishment by Juries, 17 U Chi L Rev 400, 406 (1950).
See also Moreno v Consolidated Rail Corp, 99 F3d 782, 792 (6th Cir 1996) (en banc) (de-
clining to hold that punitive damages are available under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,
29 USC § 794 (1985 & Supp 1997), in part because "It]he whole issue of punitive damages
is becoming an increasingly problematic one, of course, as a sort of game-show mentality
leads some contemporary juries to award punitive damages in amounts that seem utterly
capricious").
" Gertz v Robert Welch, Inc, 418 US 323, 350 (1974).
"A minority of jurisdictions have statutory caps on punitive damages in some or all
actions. See, for example, Fla Stat Ann § 768.73 (West 1997); Tex Civ Pract & Rem Code
Ann § 41.008 (Vernon 1997).
"' See, for example, Guzman v Western State Bank of Devils Lake, 540 F2d 948, 954
(8th Cir 1976) ('In reviewing an award of punitive damages there is no basis from which
an appellate court may measure damage."); Rowlett v Anheuser-Busch, Inc, 832 F2d 194,
207 (1st Cir 1987) (same).
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are awarded without the necessity for proof beyond a reasonable
doubt and without many of the other protections afforded in
criminal cases to minimize the risk of punishing the innocent. It
is extremely problematic to give a broad power to punish to a de-
cisionmaker that is particularly susceptible to passion and emo-
tion, in a proceeding that lacks many of the safeguards that usu-
ally precede the meting out of punishment.8 '
A related consideration that favors having judges set puni-
tive damages derives from the role that the defendant's wealth
plays in setting punitive damages. In most civil cases, evidence of
a party's wealth is inadmissible." "The underlying reason for the
rule is that such evidence tends to inject into the case a foreign,
diverting, and distracting issue which may effectuate prejudicial
results."" But when the amount of punitive damages is at issue,
a plaintiff is allowed to introduce evidence of the defendant's fi-
nances,185 on the theory that "the degree of punishment or deter-
rence resulting from a judgment is to some extent in proportion to
" The National Law Journal's annual surveys of large jury verdicts, while perhaps not
complete, suggest the frequency with which juries return enormous awards of punitive
damages. The 1993 survey reported four punitive damages awards of $250 million or
more, three awards of approximately $100 million, ten awards of between $20 million and
$100 million, and ten awards of between $5 million and $20 million. Despite Tort Reform,
Huge Verdicts Continue Climbing, Nal L J $2-S12, S14, S16-S17 (Jan 17, 1994). The 1994
survey reported the $5 billion award in the Exxon Valdez case, a $1.2 billion award in a
suit for human rights abuses brought against the estate of Ferdinand Marcos, an award of
$173 million, sixteen awards of between $20 million and $100 million, and thirteen more
awards of between $5 million and $20 million. Verdicts: The Big Numbers of 1994, Natl L
J C2-C16 (Feb 6, 1995). The 1995 survey reported a $400 million award, two $300 million
awards, a $175 million award, six awards of between $50 million and $70 million, seven
awards of between $20 million and $25 million, and seven awards of between $7 million
and $19 million. Verdicts: The Big Numbers of 1995, Natl L J C2-C15 (Feb 5, 1996). The
1996 survey reported a $386 million award, a $210 million award, a $200 million award,
six awards of between $100 million and $150 million, seven awards of between $23 million
and $60 million, seven awards of between $12 million and $18 million, and three awards
of approximately $10 million. Verdicts: The Big Numbers of 1996, Natl L J C2-C10, C12,
C14 (Feb 10, 1997).
A study ofjury awards in state courts of general jurisdiction in the seventy-five largest
counties in cases involving tort, contract, and real property claims, for the year ended
June 30, 1992, identified 364 awards of punitive damages; the mean award was $735,000
and the median award $50,000. Bureau of Justice Statistics Special Report: Civil Jury
Cases and Verdicts in Large Counties 1, 8 (DOJ 1995).
" See, for example, Geddes, PMC v United Financial Group, 559 F2d 557, 560 (9th Cir
1977); Eisenhauer v Burger, 431 F2d 833, 837 (6th Cir 1970); Blankenship v Rowntree, 219
F2d 597, 598 (10th Cir 1955). See also Parkins v Brown, 241 F2d 367, 368 n 2 (5th Cir
1957) (allowing evidence of wealth "only if the evidence develops a case warranting the
jury in awarding punitive or exemplary damages").
8 Blankenship, 219 F2d at 598.
"See Gerald W. Boston, Punitive Damages in Tort Law § 32:1 at 2-3 (Clark, Board-
man 1993).
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the means of the guilty person."'86 Whatever the merits of, the
theory,8 7 evidence that a defendant has a huge net worth often
contributes to a staggering verdict.
The Supreme Court recognized this problem in Honda Motor
Co v Oberg,"'5 in which it held that a state violates due process by
letting juries set punitive damages but not permitting review by a
trial or appellate court for excessiveness. The Court stressed that
"the presentation of evidence of a defendant's net worth creates
the potential that juries will use their verdicts to express biases
against big businesses, particularly those without strong local
presences." 9 Unless the amount of punitive damages is deter-
mined in a separate phase of the trial, it seems clear that admis-
sion of evidence of wealth also may skew the jury's assessment of
liability for compensatory and punitive damages and of the
amount of compensatory damages. The significant increase in in-
come inequality among Americans since the 1960s 9 ' has likely
exacerbated the risk created by admission of evidence of wealth.
Judges are better suited than juries to give appropriate
weight to a defendant's finances. They are less likely to be
swayed by arguments that seek to base the calculation of punitive
damages on a percentage of the defendant's net wealth or income.
Because of their responsibility for sentencing in criminal
cases and for imposing civil statutory penalties, judges ordinarily
have much more experience than jurors in determining punish-
ments and far more familiarity with the sanctions imposed for
"Restatement (Second) of Torts § 908 comment e (1977).
"In the case of organizational defendants, the theory has been sharply criticized on
the ground that profit-maximizing organizations are interested in the marginal (not the
total) costs of activities relative to the marginal benefits. The total wealth of the organiza-
tion generally has little to do with the expected marginal costs or benefits of actions. It has
been argued that, by linking punitive damages to wealth, the law creates too much deter-
rence for large corporations and too little for small ones. See Robert D. Cooter, Punitive
Damages for Deterrence: When and How Much?, 40 Ala L Rev 1143, 1176-77 (1989);
Malcolm E. Wheeler, A Proposal for Further Common Law Development of the Use of Puni-
tive Damages in Modem Product Liability Litigation, 40 Ala L Rev 919, 950-51 (1989);
Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr., Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Damages, 56 S Cal L
Rev 1, 62 (1982). See also Zazz! Designs v L'Ordal, SA, 979 F2d 499, 508 (7th Cir 1992);
Thomas v E.J. Korvette, Inc, 329 F Supp 1163, 1170 (E D Pa 1971), revd on other grounds,
476 F2d 471 (3d Cir 1973) ("Wlt is probably safe to assume that any substantial amount of
punitive damages would have deterrent effect, irrespective of the size of the corporation.").
1- 512 US 415, 432 (1994).
19 Id.
'See Daniel A. Weinberg, A Brief Look at Postwar U.S. Income Inequality, Current
Population Reports P60-191 (Census Bureau June 1996) (finding 22.4 percent increase in
income inequality from 1968 to 1994, using the Gini index of income concentration).
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various types of misconduct.' 9' Referring to Alabama's procedures
for setting punitive damages, Justice Powell once observed in a
draft opinion that "[t]he jurors who pass sentence on tort defen-
dants according to these procedures probably have never decided
a punitive damages case before. Thus, they have no basis for de-
191 See Atlas Food Systems and Services, Inc v Crane National Vendors, Inc, 99 F3d
587, 594 (4th Cir 1996):
[Plolicy-related elements--e.g., the likelihood that an award will deter the defendant
or others from engaging in similar conduct-are not factual questions and, therefore,
are more appropriately decided by the trial judge. The judge's unique vantage point
and day-to-day experience with such matters lend expertise and consistency....
[Tihe district courts ... themselves are required frequently to impose penalties for
punishment and deterrence in a wide array of circumstances, both in civil and in
criminal contexts. Indeed, in criminal cases, our system gives juries virtually no in-
put, except in capital cases, to determine the amount of penalties.
See also Gilbert v St. Louis-San Francisco Railroad Co, 514 F2d 1277, 1280-81 (5th
Cir 1975) (stressing that compensatory and punitive damages "are not administrable in
the same fashion," and upholding remittitur of award from $225,000 to $60,000 because
trial judge "could not justify, on principles of legal policy, a jury award in this case which
so vastly exceeded an earlier award in a stronger case"); Owen, Comment, 56 S Cal L Rev
at 120 (cited in note 11) ("Judges have more familiarity than do juries with distinguishing
'wrong' from 'very wrong' behavior (and fixing the appropriate level of punishment there-
for) upon a formal social scale ...."); Zoppo v Homestead Insurance Co, 71 Ohio St 3d 552,
644 NE2d 397, 404 (1994) (Wright, joined by Moyer, dissenting):
In order to reach a fair punishment, the decision'maker must be able to compare the
wrongful conduct in this case against similar conduct in other cases. Additionally,
such a broad perspective is essential in order to set a level of damages which, while
fair, will adequately deter such wrongful conduct in the future. This broad perspec-
tive, which is necessary to give effect to the purposes of punitive damages, makes the
judge and not the jury the appropriate decision-maker. The knowledge and experi-
ence necessary to set punitive damages effectively are unique to the judge alone.
The Zoppo majority held that a statute ordering judicial assessment of punitive damages
violated the right to jury trial protected by the Ohio Constitution, id at 401, and did not
address whether, as a matter of policy, judges or juries are better suited to assess punitive
damages. Compare Torres v North American Van Lines, Inc, 135 Ariz 35, 658 P2d 835, 841
(Ariz App 1982) (relying in part on trial judge's experience in personal injury lawsuits in
affirming remittitur that cut punitive damages award by 75 percent). Since they took ef-
fect in 1987, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines have been interpreted by many courts to
limit significantly the ability of federal judges to tailor sentences to the facts of the case.
In Koon v United States, 116 S Ct 2035 (1996), however, the Supreme Court emphasized
the importance of taking into account individual circumstances in sentencing under the
Guidelines. Id at 2053 ("It has been uniform and constant in the federal judicial tradition
for the sentencing judge to consider every convicted person as an individual and every
case as a unique study in the human failings that sometimes mitigate, sometimes mag-
nify, the crime and punishment to ensue."); see also id at 2044 (noting that Congress
"[aicknowledged the wisdom, even the necessity, of sentencing procedures that take into
account individual circumstances"). Even when a court does not depart from the Guide-
lines range deemed to be applicable, it must exercise discretion in choosing a sentence
within the range.
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termining what penalties are common in particular kinds of
cases."
192
Because judges are in a better position to impose a punish-
ment that is in line with the punishments imposed for similar
misconduct, determination of the amount of punitive damages by
judges would promote the interest in treating like cases alike.' 9
As Professor Colleen Murphy has written, "[w]ith professional
and ongoing experience in matters of public policy, the judge pre-
sumably effectuates public policy goals with greater consistency
than the one-time jury.""
Whereas jury verdicts awarding punitive damages simply in-
dicate a dollar amount, a judge could be required to state the rea-
sons for the amount of punitive damages awarded.' 95 This would
greatly facilitate appellate review.' 9 Under the current proce-
dure, one can only speculate as to what led the jury to award pu-
nitive damages in the amount it chose. It may have relied upon
an improper premise or one unsupported by the record, but the
error may never be known. A requirement that a judge state the
reasons for a punitive damages award would reduce the risk of
undisclosed error.
Although trial judges' statements of reasons would reveal
some errors that might go uncorrected on appeal if made by a
jury, in general shifting to judges the responsibility to set puni-
tive damages would have the salutary effect of reducing the role
of appellate courts in setting punitive damages."' Under the ex-
"'Aetna Life Insurance Co v Lavoie, 475 US 813 (1986) (draft opinion of Powell), ex-
cerpted in Lewis Powell, The 'Bizarre Results' of Punitive Damages, Wall St J A21 (Mar 8,
1995).
" Compare Markman, 116 S Ct at 1396 (holding that judges rather than juries should
construe patents in part because of "the importance of uniformity in the treatment of a
given patent).
"' Murphy, 61 Geo Wash L Rev at 739-40 (cited in note 134) (footnotes omitted).
" Some state appellate courts have imposed similar requirements with respect to trial
court rulings on post-trial motions challenging a jury's punitive damages award as exces-
sive. See, for example, VF Corp v Wrexham Aviation Corp, 112 Md App 703, 686 A2d 647,
660 (1996), cert granted, 346 Md 28, 686 A2d 647 (1997); Hodges v S.C. Toof & Co, 833
SW2d 896, 902 (Tenn 1992).
'See Redish, 70 Nw U L Rev at 504 n 75 (cited in note 31) (noting that factual find-
ings by district judges "must be made explicitly, and are subject to appellate review," but
"([flact findings by juries ... usually come in the form of an enigmatic general verdict, and
are less susceptible to appellate review"). See also Charles E. Wyzanski, Jr., A Trial
Judge's Freedom and Responsibility, 65 Harv L Rev 1281, 1292-93 (1952) (arguing that
judges should state the reasons for sentences in criminal cases, as a safeguard against
"emotion or other transient factors").
"'See generally Charles Alan Wright, The Doubtful Omniscience of Appellate Courts,
41 Minn L Rev 751, 752-58 (1957).
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isting system of jury awards of punitive damages, the real deter-
ruination of punitive damages often takes place on appeal.98 In
countless cases, appellate courts have drastically reduced awards
of punitive damages.9 9 Appellate courts have taken such action
despite the vagueness of the criteria governing the determination
of the amount of punitive damages.00
'A study of punitive damage awards returned in product liability cases between 1965
and 1990 found that roughly 55 percent were affirmed; the remainder were reversed or
reduced. Michael Rustadt, Demystifying Punitive Damages in Product Liability Cases: A
Survey of a Quarter Century of Trial Verdicts 31-32 (Roscoe Pound Foundation 1991).
'See, for example, Lee v Edwards, 101 F3d 805, 812-13 (2d Cir 1996) (reducing jury's
$200,000 punitive damages award to $75,000); Continental Trend Resources, Inc v OXY
USA, Inc, 101 F3d 634, 643 (10th Cir 1996), cert denied, 117 S Ct 1846 (1997) (reducing
$30 million punitive damages award to $6 million); Vasbinder v Scott, 976 F2d 118, 121-22
(2d Cir 1992) (reducing two $150,000 punitive damages awards to $20,000 and $30,000);
Mason v Texaco, Inc, 948 F2d 1546, 1561 (10th Cir 1991) (halving $25 million punitive
damages award); Rowlett v Anheuser-Busch, Inc, 832 F2d 194, 206-07 (1st Cir 1987) (re-
ducing punitive damages award from $3 million to $300,000); Hollins v Powell, 773 F2d
191, 194, 198 (8th Cir 1985) (reducing $500,000 punitive damages award to $2,000); Ram-
sey v American Air Filter Co, 772 F2d 1303, 1314 (7th Cir 1985) (reducing $150,000 puni-
tive damages award to $20,000); Morrill v Becton, Dickinson and Co, 747 F2d 1217, 1225
(8th Cir 1984) (reducing $20 million punitive damages award to $3 million); Bell v City of
Milwaukee, 746 F2d 1205, 1267 (7th Cir 1984) (reducing $350,000 punitive damages
award to $50,000). See generally Eric Schnapper, Judges Against Juries-Appellate Re-
view of Federal Civil Jury Verdicts, 1989 Wis L Rev 237, 334-36. For similar state deci-
sions, see, for example, Texaco, Inc v Pennzoil Co, 729 SW2d 768, 784, 865-66 (Tex App
1987) (reducing $3 billion punitive damages award to $1 billion); Faulk v Aware, Inc, 244
NYS2d 259, 266 (NY App Div 1963) (reducing two $1.25 million punitive damages awards
to $50,000 and $100,000), affd, 14 NY2d 899, 200 NE2d 778 (1964); Miller v Schnitzer, 78
Nev 301, 371 P2d 824, 829, 831 n 3 (1962) (reducing $50,000 punitive damages award to
$5,000).
'Judge Lee Sarokin described judicial intervention with respect to punitive damages
as follows:
With the vague guidance given to juries as to the means for calculating [punitive]
damages, it is difficult to justify judicial intercession on the basis that the amount of
the award is invalid as a matter of law. What occurs in reality is an independent fac-
tual finding by the court simply that the penalty is too great.
Juzwin v Amtorg Trading Corp, 705 F Supp 1053, 1057 (D NJ 1989), modified on other
grounds, 718 F Supp 1233 (D NJ 1989). Although it is submitted that Judge Sarokin was
incorrect in using the term "factual finding" to describe the determination of the proper
amount of punitive damages, he shrewdly looked behind the rhetoric of deference that
often obscures a de novo judicial assessment of how severe the penalty should be. See also
Miller, 371 P2d at 829 (citations omitted):
One cannot avoid thinking that the general rules offered to explain the reviewing
court's decision are tailored to fit its feeling about the particular case before it. If that
court does not approve the verdict it will state that the jury was motivated by passion
or prejudice or that a "reasonable relationship" between the punitive and compensa-
tory awards does not exist; or that the amount of the award is "enormous." On the
other hand, the reviewing court in affirming the award may rely upon the converse of
the reasons just mentioned, or upon a strong presumption in favor of the verdict as
confirmed by the trial judge in refusing a new trial, or some other equally plausible
statement.
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If trial judges were responsible for awarding punitive dam-
ages, there would likely be fewer enormous awards. The occasions
for appellate intervention would be fewer, and appellate courts
could be expected to heed more closely precedents that ostensibly
limit appellate review of the amount of damages awarded.2 °' The
result of having trial judges set punitive damages would be to re-
duce the frequency with which punitive damages are effectively
set on a cold record by judges who heard none of the testimony
presented at trial.0 2
Judges are also better equipped than juries to give proper
weight to other sanctions that have been imposed on the defen-
dant for the same conduct. Under the law of many states, prior
fines, civil penalties, or awards of punitive damages militate in
favor of a lower punitive award.0  As a practical matter, however,
to require a defendant to present such proof to a jury is virtually
to eliminate prior punishment as a mitigating factor. As Judge
Sarokin observed with respect to evidence of prior punitive
awards, "[t]o require a defendant to present such prejudicial evi-
dence to a jury as its only alternative is to place it between Scylla
and Charybdis."' °4 Evidence that another jury, court, or agency
Under traditional doctrine, a plaintiff may decline a remittitur and insist upon a new
trial. See, for example, Vasbinder, 976 F2d at 122-23. With respect to punitive awards,
some appellate decisions have departed from this principle, remanding with instructions
to enter judgment in a reduced amount, rather than affording the plaintiff the option of a
new trial. See, for example, Rowlett, 832 F2d at 207; Guzman, 540 F2d at 954.
"
1See, for example, Browning-Ferris Industries of Vermont, Inc v Kelco Disposal, Inc,
492 US 257, 279 (1989) (holding that trial court's ruling on motion for remittitur is re-
viewable "under an abuse-of-discretion standard") (footnote omitted). In BMW of North
America, Inc v Gore, 116 S Ct 1589, 1598-1604 (1996), the Supreme Court identified three
"guideposts" that led it to conclude that an award of punitive damages was so excessive as
to violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The application of the
due process limitation established in BMW may not be subject to the abuse-of-discretion
standard.
On a related point, see Patrick E. Higginbotham, Juries and the Death Penalty, 41
Case W Res L Rev 1047, 1065 (1991) ("[W]e should submit the capital sentencing decision
either to the judge or to the jury but not to both, and we should not permit it to be made
independently by an appellate court.").
'See, for example, Green Oil Co v Hornsby, 539 S2d 218, 224 (Ala 1989). See gener-
ally Restatement (Second) of Torts § 908 comment e (1977) ("Another factor that may af-
fect the amount of punitive damages is the existence of multiple claims by numerous per-
sons affected by the wrongdoer's conduct.").
'Juzwin, 705 F Supp at 1056, modified on other grounds, 718 F Supp 1233 (D NJ
1989). See also Games v Fleming Landfill, Inc, 186 W Va 656, 413 SE2d 897, 909 (1991)
(Judge rather than jury should consider prior criminal sanctions or civil awards.); Model
Punitive Damages Act § 10(a), 14 ULA 63 (Cum Ann Pkt Pt 1997) (Court may reduce pu-
nitive damages award if defendant was previously found liable for punitive damages un-
der a final judgment arising from the same course of conduct, and the second award would
be unfairly duplicative.).
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has sanctioned the defendant is at least as likely to lead a jury to
increase its award as it is to lead it to reduce the award.
If judges set punitive damages, cases in which such damages
were found to be warranted also could be resolved more quickly
and with less expense. Today it is not unusual for a jury's puni-
tive damages award to be followed by further proceedings at the
trial court level that may stretch out over several months. In ad-
dition to memoranda of law supporting and opposing a remittitur,
evidence not before the jury is often tendered and considered." 5 If
the trial judge grants a remittitur which the plaintiff accepts, the
defendant may still appeal. Vesting in judges the authority to set
punitive damages would significantly shorten the process.
B. The Insufficient Advantages of Assessment by Juries
The foregoing considerations strongly support shifting to
judges the responsibility to decide the amount of punitive dam-
ages. They are not outweighed by the interests that might be
served by leaving that responsibility with juries.
The Supreme Court has said that the purpose of jury trials in
civil cases is "to assure a fair and equitable resolution of factual
issues." Although other interests are served by civil jury trials,
the notion that a jury has a superior ability to decide issues of
credibility and other factual issues is plainly one of the principal
justifications for civil jury trials.
This justification provides little support for asking juries to
set punitive damages. No doubt the parties may dispute some
facts relevant to the amount of punitive damages. In general,
however, fact resolution is likely to be less significant than the
exercise of judgment as to how large an award is warranted to
serve the purposes of punitive damages.0 ' When the amount of
punitive damages is considered, ordinarily the jury already will
have found that the defendant committed a wrong that caused
injury to the plaintiff, determined the extent of the plaintiff's in-
juries (economic and noneconomic), and determined that the de-
fendant acted with the degree of culpability necessary to permit
an award of punitive damages. Factual disputes certainly can
remain, just as in a criminal case there can be factual disputes
relating to sentencing. But in most cases the determination of the
See, for example, Dunn v HOVIC, 1 F3d 1371, 1389-91 (3d Cir 1993) (en banc).
'Colgrove, 413 US at 157, citing Gasoline Products Co v Champlin Co, 283 US 494,
498 (1931).
'Compare Markman, 116 S Ct at 1395.
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amount of punitive damages is driven not by factual questions
but by a subjective judgment as to the amount that will serve the
purposes of punitive damages (typically, punishing the .defendant
and deterring both the defendant and others from similar conduct
in the future2 8). As Professor Ellis has observed, determining the
amount of punitive damages "does not require answering a 'what
happened' question. Rather, it embodies the question, 'what
ought to happen' to the defendant." 9
Jury determination of the amount of punitive damages also
might be deemed preferable because a jury's verdict reflects the
judgment of all the jurors, whereas a judge's determination is the
judgment of one man or woman.210
A nineteenth century Supreme Court decision, Railroad Co v
Stout,"1 ' though not involving punitive damages, endorsed the
wisdom-of-many justification for jury trials. Stout, a six-year old,
seriously injured a foot while playing on an unguarded railroad
turntable located near a public road. The facts were not in dis-
pute. The jury returned a verdict of $7,500 against the railroad.
See Boston, Punitive Damages at §§ 2:6-2:7 (cited in note 185).
'Ellis, 40 Ala L Rev at 1004 (cited in note 11). See Murphy, 61 Geo Wash L Rev at
802 (cited in note 134) ("Even if some factors are questions of pure fact-for example, the
profitability of defendant's misconduct-the calculation of punitive damages cannot be
said to be fact-dependent .... .") (footnote omitted). See also Gasperini, 116 S Ct at 2235
(Scalia dissenting) ("[T]he level of punitive damages is not really a 'fact' 'tried' by the
jury."). The distinctive character of punitive damages determinations was aptly described
by a Justice of the Supreme Court of Oregon:
In the trial of a criminal case the jury finds the facts and two days thereafter the
judge imposes sentence. I have never heard it suggested that the judge in so doing is
finding the facts. He is exercising a purely discretionary power to impose punish-
ment, a power which is limited by the statutory maximum sentence which may be
imposed. In the same manner the jury, in determining whether to assess punitive
damages and in what amount, exercises a purely discretionary power based upon the
facts which it has already found, a power which resembles that of the trial judge, ex-
cept for the fact that his discretion is limited by statute whereas theirs is without
limit unless the court imposes one.
Van Loin v Schneiderman, 17 Or 89, 210 P2d 461, 475-76 (1949) (Brand concurring in part
and dissenting in part). See also Prince v Peterson, 538 P2d 1325, 1329 (Utah 1975) (not-
ing that in awarding punitive damages "the jury exercises a quasi-judicial function") (foot-
note omitted).
That setting punitive damages may involve some factual questions does not suggest
that judges are incapable of setting such damages. "Courts pass upon a vast number of
questions of fact.... [T]here is not, and never was, any such thing in jury trials as an
allotment of all questions of fact to the jury. The jury simply decides some questions of
fact." James Thayer, A Preliminary Treatise on Evidence at the Common Law 185 (Kelley
1969) (originally published 1898).
"'See Charles Jared Knight, Note, State-Law Punitive Damage Schemes and the Sev-
enth Amendment Right to Jury Trial in the Federal Courts, 14 Rev Litig 657, 683 (1995).
21 84 US (17 Wall) 657, 663-64 (1873).
216 " [65:179
Punitive Damages
In the Supreme Court the railroad argued that, since the facts
were undisputed, the issue of its negligence should have been de-
cided by the judge as a matter of law. 12 The Court rejected the
argument, explaining that in most cases of alleged negligence,
[u]pon the facts proven in such cases, it is a matter of judg-
ment and discretion, of sound inference, what is the deduc-
tion to be drawn from the undisputed facts.... Twelve men
of the average of the community, comprising men of educa-
tion and men of little education, men of learning and men
whose learning consists only in what they have themselves
seen and heard, the merchant, the mechanic, the farmer, the
laborer; these sit together, consult, apply their separate ex-
perience of the affairs of life to the facts proven, and draw a
unanimous conclusion. This average judgment thus given it
is the great effort of the law to obtain. It is assumed that
twelve men know more of the common affairs of life than
does one man, that they can draw wiser and safer conclu-
sions from admitted facts thus occurring than can a single
judge.2 13
Today civil juries in federal court generally have only six or
eight members rather than twelve. More importantly, however,
the nature of the decision involved in awarding punitive damages
suggests that the wisdom of a judge is preferable in this instance
to the collective wisdom of a jury. Choosing an amount of punitive
damages differs fundamentally from the determination of
whether a party was negligent and from other applications of law
to fact that are submitted to the jury even when the facts are un-
disputed (if reasonable persons could disagree about the out-
come). The determination of whether a party was negligent,
though certainly subjective in part, is guided by consideration of
what a reasonable person in the defendant's shoes would have
done. For most other issues decided by a jury there are similar
objective criteria. The choice of the amount of punitive damages
is not guided in any comparable way that makes the jury's
knowledge of "the common affairs of life" 4 particularly useful.
"Id at 659.
"Id at 663-64. See Bailey v Central Vermont Railway, Inc, 319 US 350, 353 (1943)
("[T]he fact that fair-minded men might reach different conclusions, emphasize[s] the
appropriateness of leaving the question to the jury."); Orkin Exterminating Co v Truly
Nolen, Inc, 117 S2d 419, 423 (Fla Dist Ct App 1960).
2'Stout, 84 US at 664.
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Another justification often advanced for jury trials in civil
cases is the risk of judicial bias. This justification was advanced
by the Anti-Federalists, 15 who in urging a jury-trial guarantee for
civil cases quoted the following statement by Blackstone:
The impartial administration of justice, which secures both
our persons and our properties, is the great end of civil soci-
ety. But if that be entirely entrusted to the magistracy, a
select body of men, and those generally selected by the
prince or such as enjoy the highest offices in the state, their
decisions, in spite of their own natural integrity, will have
frequently an involuntary bias towards those of their own
rank and dignity; it is not to be expected from human nature
that the few should be always attentive to the interests and
good of the many."'
In Pennsylvania, the Anti-Federalists cited an outrageous search
by a constable that had resulted in an award of damages by a
jury, and predicted that a "lordly court of justice" sitting without
a jury would be "ready to protect the officers of government
against the weak and helpless citizens."2
It cannot be denied that in some instances bias could infect
determinations of punitive damages by federal judges. But this
possibility does not provide a good reason for continuing to leave
those determinations in the hands of juries in all cases. First, a
check against the operation of judicial bias would be provided by
the fact that the amount of punitive damages would not be de-
cided by the judge unless the jury first determined that the de-
fendant was liable for punitive damages. Second, the strong tra-
dition of independence and professionalism that has developed in
the federal judiciary reduces the risk of judicial bias.21 Third, the
"See Centinel, in Herbert J. Storing, ed, 2 The Complete Anti-Federalist 143, 149
(Chicago 1981).
...Blackstone, 3 Commentaries on the Laws of England at 379 (cited in note 142) (em-
phasis added).
' 'Pennsylvania Packet (Oct 23, 1787), in John Bach McMaster and Frederick D.
Stone, eds, Pennsylvania and the Federal Constitution 154 (list Soc Penn 1888). The
author went on to say that if federal officers "commit similar or greater indignities, in
such cases a trial by jury would be our safest resource, heavy damages would at once
punish the offender and deter others from committing the same." Id. See also Essays by a
Farmer, Maryland Gaz (Feb 15, 1788), in Storing, ed, 5 The Complete Anti-Federalist at
14. 218 See Redish, 70 Nw U L Rev at 504 n 75 (cited in note 31) ("[Blecause of the generally
careful selection process, federal judges are likely to be highly experienced, intelligent
individuals steeped in traditions of the law. Thus, it is probable that at least in most cases
judges will be better able to control their prejudices than will jurors.").
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risk of judicial bias could be further reduced by having juries con-
tinue to set punitive damages in cases involving alleged abuses of
government power, in which a judge's status as part of the gov-
ernment might be a source of bias.219
It has been suggested that juries should set punitive dam-
ages because juries better represent the values of the commu-
nity."2 One of the functions of the jury system undoubtedly is to
permit the ideals and beliefs of ordinary citizens to influence the
administration of the law.22' This function of jury trials provides
little justification, however, for having juries set punitive dam-
ages.
Any allocation of decisionmaking authority to judges could be
said to reduce the influence that community values exert through
jury verdicts, but the law entrusts many important decisions to
"Punitive damages were first recognized by English courts in cases in which official
power had been abused and juries returned awards far in excess of the plaintiffs' actual
loss. See Wilkes, 98 Eng Rep at 498-99; Huckle, 95 Eng Rep at 768-69.
If further protection against judicial bias in the award of punitive damages were
deemed important, a proposal made years ago by the late Judge Edward J. Devitt could be
adopted in part. Although Judge Devitt advocated amending the Constitution to eliminate
the right to a jury trial in civil cases, he also suggested that, short of such an amendment,
the statute permitting a party to seek disqualification of a judge based on bias or preju-
dice, 28 USC § 144, be amended "to provide a peremptory challenge when counsel ques-
tioned the fairness of the assigned judge," so that more litigants would be willing to waive
a jury trial. Edward J. Devitt, Federal Civil Jury Trials Should Be Abolished, 60 ABA J
570, 572 (1974). Such a peremptory challenge could be provided in cases in which punitive
damages are sought. In 1997, bills were introduced in Congress that would have given
each side in a case in federal court one opportunity to request reassignment of the case to
a different judge. HR 520, 105th Cong, 1st Sess § 2 (1997) (civil and criminal cases); HR
1252, 105th Cong, 1st Sess § 6 (1997) (civil cases only).
The Anti-Federalists also touted jury trials in civil cases as a safeguard against cor-
ruption, on the ground that it is more difficult to bribe jurors than judges because "it is
not, generally, known till the hour the cause comes on for trial, what persons are to form
the jury." Federal Farmer 15 (Jan 18, 1788), in Storing, ed, 2 The Complete Anti-Federalist
at 321 (cited in note 215). See also Federalist 83 (Hamilton), in Rossiter, ed, The Federalist
Papers at 500 (cited in note 25) ("there is always more time and better opportunity to
tamper with a standing body of magistrates than with a jury summoned for the occasion").
The extended length of many modern jury trials would seem to make the lack of pretrial
knowledge of the jurors' identity a poor safeguard against bribery. Moreover, bribery of
judges has been an extremely rare occurrence in the federal judicial system.
'See Alan Howard Scheiner, Note, Judicial Assessment of Punitive Damages, the
Seventh Amendment, and the Politics of Jury Power, 91 Colum L Rev 142, 188-89, 196-97
(1991). See also Knecht v Radiac Abrasives, Inc, 219 l App 3d 379, 579 NE2d 1248, 1251
(1991) ("The jury, with its unique ability to articulate community values, should decide
whether punitive damages should be imposed.").
"See, for example, Markman, 116 S Ct at 1395 (referring to jury's ability "to reflect
community standards"); Oliver Wendell Holmes, Law in Science and Science in Law, 12
Harv L Rev 443, 459-60 (1899) (citing the jury's role in keeping the law in accord with
community values as a function served by entrusting determinations of negligence to the
jury).
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judges, such as sentencing, imposition of civil penalties, and
grant or denial of injunctions and declaratory judgments. Moreo-
ver, as Judge Kozinski has noted recently, whereas "[legislators
are popularly elected and represent a variety of geographic and
other interests... [,] any group of six or 12 individuals may have
views wholly unrepresentative of the community at large."222 The
reduction in the size of civil juries in federal cases makes par-
ticularly suspect the notion that a jury is a reliable barometer of
community values. When the issue of the proper amount of puni-
tive damages arises, the defendant already has been found, ordi-
narily by a jury, to have engaged in culpable conduct. Particu-
larly given the other considerations suggesting that judges are
better equipped than jurors to set punitive damages, it seems bet-
ter to bypass this one opportunity for the expression of commu-
nity values through juries, and to rely on judges to be guided by
established norms of which they will be well aware (such as the
need to respect persons and property).
Jury trials also afford citizens an opportunity to participate
in government. As one Anti-Federalist tract argued,
The trial by jury in the judicial department, and the collec-
tion of the people by their representatives in the legislature,
are those fortunate inventions which have procured for
them, in this country, their true proportion of influence, and
the wisest and most fit means of protecting themselves in
the community. Their situation, as jurors and representa-
tives, enables them to acquire information and knowledge in
the affairs and government of the society; and to come for-
ward, in turn, as the centinels and guardians of each other.
The participatory function of jury trials is important, but it does
not deserve great weight with respect to the allocation of power
under consideration here. To assign judges the power to set puni-
tive damages would merely confer on judges the power to decide
one aspect (the determination of amount) of one remedy (punitive
damages). It would not substantially reduce the opportunity for
public participation in government through jury service.2 4
'Kozinski, Ind Law at 12 (cited in note 11). See also Martin A. Kotler, Reappraising
the Jury's Role as Finder of Fact, 20 Ga L Rev 123, 171-72 (1985) (arguing that juries are
not "representative of the same group of persons as the legislature").
'Federal Farmer 4 (Oct 12, 1787), in Storing, ed, 2 The Complete Anti-Federalist at
249-50 (cited in note 215). See Scheiner, Note, 91 Colum L Rev at 195 (cited in note 220)
("[J]ury participation in the assessment of damages is a living form of direct democracy.").
'See, for example, Comment, Criminal Safeguards and the Punitive Damages Defen-
dant, 34 U Chi L Rev 408, 421 (1967) ("[D]emocracy will not falter if a jury does not par-
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It has been argued that juries should set punitive damages
because "the right to trial by jury lends credence to the decisions
of our courts and engenders public confidence in the legal sys-
tem," and "any efforts on behalf of the judiciary to substantially
detract from that right... will weaken the confidence of the peo-
ple in the courts." Although it is true that jury trials tradition-
ally have been thought to be important in maintaining confidence
in the legal system, the reality is that awards of punitive dam-
ages returned by juries are set aside altogether or reduced in an
extraordinarily high percentage of cases."' If anything, taking
determinations of the amount of punitive damages away from ju-
ries might well increase public confidence in the judicial system,
because it would end a type of jury verdict that is partially or en-
tirely overturned with exceptional frequency-perhaps more of-
ten than any other type of jury verdict. Moreover, the suggested
change would merely take from the jury one part of one issue; ju-
ries would still determine liability for compensatory damages,
amount of compensatory damages, and liability for punitive dam-
ages.
C. Summary
In cases brought in federal court, the responsibility to set
punitive damages should rest with the trial judge (except in cases
involving alleged abuses of governmental power).227 The jury
could be asked to return an advisory verdict on the amount of pu-
nitive damages; Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 39(c) expressly
authorizes the use of advisory juries.2" Ultimately, however, the
power to determine the proper amount of punitive damages
should rest with the trial judge, subject to appellate review.229
VI. IMPLEMENTING THE CHANGE
It might be questioned whether federal courts, even if dis-
posed to do so, can implement the change recommended here on
their own, or whether they must await a statute or an amend-
ticipate in every proceeding.").
Knight, Note, 14 Rev Litig at 683-84 (cited in note 210).
'See notes 198-99.
'See text accompanying notes 218-20.
' See generally Note, Practice and Potential of the Advisory Jury, 100 Harv L Rev
1363, 1364-67 (1987).
'Where not precluded by a jury-trial guarantee of the applicable state constitution,
the proposal advanced here may also merit consideration in state court systems with a
strong tradition of a professional and independent judiciary.
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ment to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. No statute or
amendment to the Rules is necessary.
In Colgrove,"' the Supreme Court upheld a local federal
court rule providing that juries in civil cases would consist of six
persons. Not only was there no statute or Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure authorizing six-person juries, but at that time Rule 48
provided that "[t]he parties may stipulate that the jury shall con-
sist of any number less than twelve" and thus contemplated a
twelve-person jury absent such a stipulation. The Court held that
Rule 48 was no obstacle to the local rule, because it was drafted
in light of the assumption, held in Colgrove to be incorrect, that a
trial by jury meant a trial by a jury of twelve persons. 2 Since no
provision of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure even reflects the
assumption that juries are to set punitive damages, under Col-
grove federal courts are free to adopt local rules providing for ju-
dicial determination of the amount of punitive damages. Even
absent a local rule, an individual judge presumably may consider
providing in a pretrial order that the amount of punitive damages
will be set by the court if liability for such damages is found by
the jury.2s
CONCLUSION
An award of punitive damages is a "windfall" to the plain-
tiff.2 ' As one court put it, the plaintiff "is the fortuitous benefici-
ary of such an award simply because there is no one else to re-
ceive it." 5 It would be anomalous if the fortuitous beneficiary of a
windfall had a constitutional right to choose the decisionmaker
who determines the amount of the windfall. It would also be
anomalous if defendants in civil cases had a constitutional right
'"413 US at 163-64.
'"See id at 185 (Marshall dissenting).
'See id at 163-64. Rule 48 was amended in 1991 to direct trial courts to seat juries of
not fewer than six and not more than twelve members. 28 USCA Rule 48 (1992).
'In diversity cases, a state practice of asking juries to fix punitive damages need not
be followed unless it is bound up with state-created rights and obligations. The allocation
of power between judges and juries is ordinarily a matter of federal procedural law, not an
issue on which state law must be followed under the Erie doctrine. See Byrd v Blue Ridge
Rural Electric Cooperative, 356 US 525, 535-40 (1958); Meyers v Selznick Co, 373 F2d 218,
222 n 1 (2d Cir 1966). Compare Tingley Systems, Inc v Norse Systems, Inc, 49 F3d 93, 96
(2d Cir 1994) (provision of Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act assigning determina-
tion of punitive damages to judge would have justified a new trial in case brought in fed-
eral court, where the district court has submitted the issue of punitive damages to the
jury).
' City of Newport v Fact Concerts, Inc, 453 US 247, 267 (1981).
'Katko v Briney, 183 NW2d 657, 662 (Iowa 1971).
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to have punitive damages set by a jury, whereas in criminal cases
judges determine sentences of imprisonment (and in some cases
even death ). Because the Seventh Amendment need not and
should not be interpreted to entitle either plaintiffs or defendants
to have a jury fix punitive damages, judicial assessment of puni-
tive damages merits much more consideration than it has re-
ceived, as an alternative to caps and other reforms designed to
curb excessive awards.
'See Ala Code § 13A-5-47(e) (Michie 1994); Fla Stat Ann § 921.141(3) (West 1996).
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